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Abstract
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were created to reduce unwarranted sentencing dispar-
ities among similar defendants. This paper explores the impact of increased judicial discretion
on racial disparities in sentencing after the Guidelines were struck down in United States v.
Booker (2005). Using data on the universe of federal defendants, I find that black defendants
are sentenced to almost two months more in prison compared to their white counterparts after
Booker, a 4% increase in average sentence length. To identify the sources of racial disparities,
I construct a dataset linking judges to over 400,000 defendants. Exploiting the random assign-
ment of cases to judges, I find that racial disparities are greater among judges appointed after
Booker, suggesting acculturation to the Guidelines by judges with experience sentencing un-
der a mandatory regime. Prosecutors also respond to increased judicial discretion by charging
black defendants with longer mandatory minimums.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sentencing disparities by race, gender, education, and socioeconomic status are prevalent in
the federal criminal justice system. Black defendants are sentenced to five months longer in prison
than white defendants who commit similar offenses and have similar observable demographic traits
and criminal history. Male defendants are sentenced to over five months more in prison than
similar female defendants, and defendants with lower educational attainment and income receive
significantly longer sentences than otherwise similar offenders (Mustard 2001). Even within the
same court, judges appear to vary significantly in their treatment of defendant race (Abrams et al.
2012), suggesting that racial disparities in the the criminal justice system may be a source of the
overrepresentation of blacks in the prison population.
In response to concerns that judges were introducing unwarranted disparities in sentencing
(Frankel 1973), Congress adopted the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) under
the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1984. While the Guidelines reduced inter-judge sentencing
disparities in its early years (Anderson, Stith, and Kling 1999), it was criticized for its rigidity
(e.g., Freed 1992 and Stith 2008), and for shifting power to prosecutors in their charge and plea
bargaining decisions (Stith and Cabranes 1998, Alschuler 1978, Nagel and Schulhofer 1992).
After almost two decades of mandatory Guidelines sentencing, the Guidelines were struck
down in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Booker greatly increased the degree of
judicial discretion afforded to judges (See, e.g., Berman 2005), with subsequent cases further in-
creasing judicial discretion by reducing the degree of appellate scrutiny. Empirical work on the
impact of Booker suggests increases in inter-judge sentencing disparities (Scott 2010), but has
yielded mixed results on racial disparities, with some researchers finding large racial disparities
in the aftermath of Booker (United States Sentencing Commission 2006, 2010) and others finding
no significant impact on racial disparities in sentence length (Ulmer et al. 2010).1 Some scholars
have even argued that judicial discretion may actually mitigate recent increases in racial dispar-
ities (Fischman and Schanzenbach 2012, Starr and Rehavi 2012).2 In light of possible evidence
of increasing disparities post Booker, the United States Sentencing Commission and policymakers
have considered possible ways to constrain judicial discretion, such as “resurrecting” the manda-
tory Guidelines (Sessions 2011).
This paper estimates the impact of increased judicial discretion via Booker on racial disparities
in federal sentencing using data on the universe of defendants sentenced between 1994-2009. I
1Both studies fail to account for district court differences, interactions between offender criminal history and of-
fense severity, and condition on endogenous decisions to deviate from the Guidelines, which explain a large portion of
increased racial disparities after Booker.
2Starr and Rehavi (2012) find no change in racial disparities in the immediate aftermath of Booker using a regres-
sion discontinuity approach, but their local estimate is unable to account for racial disparities that emerge after later
changes in appellate review, as well as the entrance of new judges to the federal bench.
1
use a differences-in-differences (DD) methodology to compare the sentence disparities between
similar defendants within a district court before and after Booker and find that racial disparities
increase significantly after Booker controlling for extensive offender and crime characteristics.
The black-white sentencing gap increases by almost 2 months in the post Booker period, a 75%
increase in the baseline racial gap, and a 4% increase in the average sentence length. Increased
racial disparities in sentence length can be attributed to black defendants being more likely to be
sentenced above the Guidelines recommended range, and less likely to be sentenced below the
Guidelines recommended range, compared to similar white offenders. Even conditional on being
sentenced within the Guidelines range, black defendants receive significantly longer sentences than
similar white defendants.
The results are robust to controlling for different racial trends in sentencing outcomes, and
changes induced by other laws and court decisions. Racial disparities in sentencing persist after ac-
counting for differential treatment of offenders based on other observable traits after Booker, such
as educational attainment and criminal history. I also find evidence that the racial sentencing gap
expands after periods of more deferential appellate review, suggesting that judges are particularly
responsive to changes in the likelihood of appellate reversal. A potential threat to identification
is the possibility of endogenous measures of offense severity. To account for this concern, I link
defendants across datasets from the arrest to sentencing stage, and obtain highly detailed measures
of arrest offense, a plausibly exogenous measure of offense severity. Results are robust to control-
ling for arrest offense, suggesting that differential fact-finding at the sentencing stage cannot fully
explain the increase in racial disparities.
Next, I examine the sources of increasing disparities after Booker by studying how different
types of judges respond to increased judicial discretion. Many scholars have suggested that judges
have different sentencing philosophies (e.g., Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback 1999), which may be
affected by the standard of appellate review (Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011), with correlations
between sentencing practices and judicial characteristics such as race, gender, and political affili-
ation (Welch 1988, Schanzenbach 2005, Schanzenbach and Tiller 2007, Schanzenbach and Tiller
2008). However, prior empirical research on inter-judge disparity and the impact of judicial demo-
graphics on sentencing practices has been hampered by the lack of judge identifiers. Relying on
aggregate district-level variation in judicial demographics can lead to biased estimates if districts
with different judicial compositions differ in ways that affect all judges within the district court.
I surmount these issues by utilizing a novel dataset constructed for this study. Matching three
data sources, I construct a dataset of over 400,000 criminal defendants linked to sentencing judge
from fiscal years 2000-2009. Given that cases are randomly assigned to judges within a district
court, any difference in sentencing practices across judges can be attributable to judge differences,
rather than case composition. Exploiting the random assignment of cases to judges in this dataset,
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I find that increases in racial disparities after Booker are larger among post Booker appointed
judges, even after accounting for the fact that these judges are George W. Bush appointees. Nor are
the sentencing patterns of post Booker judges explained by the fact that these judges are relatively
“new” to federal sentencing, based on comparisons to “new” judges in earlier cohorts. My findings
suggest that judges with experience sentencing under the Guidelines may have become relatively
acculturated to the Guidelines regime, compared to newer judges who began their tenure in a post
Booker regime.
I conclude by considering the impact of judicial discretion on other actors in the criminal jus-
tice system. Arrest, charge, trial and plea bargaining decisions made earlier in the process are
all ripe avenues for unwarranted bias (Anwar et al. 2012, Rehavi and Starr 2012). After Booker,
prosecutors have commented that they are far less willing to forego charging mandatory minimums
when judges ultimately sentence defendants to terms far below the Guidelines recommended min-
imum sentence. Consistent with this story, I find evidence that increased judicial discretion via
Booker changes the prosecutorial treatment of statutory mandatory minimums, which Booker left
intact. Black offenders are far more likely to be charged with mandatory minimums than similar
white offenders, and after Booker, black defendants are significantly more likely to face mandatory
minimums that exceed their Guidelines minimum compared to white defendants, consistent with
prosecutors attempting to rein in judicial discretion.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a brief legal background of the Guide-
lines and the Booker decision. Section III describes the data and presents summary statistics.
Section IV presents a simple conceptual framework for judicial sentencing. Section V provides the
empirical methodology. Section VI presents results, and Section VII concludes.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
II.A. Adoption of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
For over a century prior to the adoption of the Guidelines, judges had virtually unfettered
discretion to determine the lengths of sentences. A 1977 study of Virginia state district court judges
revealed that while judges generally agreed on the verdict in legal cases, they applied radically
different sentences (Austin and Williams 1977). A 1988 study of federal courts similarly found that
white collar offenders who committed similar offenses received very different sentences depending
on the court in which they were sentenced (Wheeler at al. 1988).
By the 1970s, the legal community and public expressed alarm at the widespread disparities
in criminal sentencing that resulted from this indeterminate sentencing regime (Frankel 1973).
Some members of the public argued that judges and parole boards endangered public safety with
lenient sentencing of criminals (Tonry 2005). Others were distressed by inequitable and arbitrary
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treatment within the criminal justice system. The American Friends Service Committee claimed
that decreasing discretion among judges was the only way to eliminate racial discrimination in the
criminal justice system (American Friends Service Committee 1971).
Policymakers also recognized that judges were often “left to apply [their] own notions of the
purposes of sentencing,” leading to “an unjustifiably wide range of sentences to offenders convicted
for similar crimes” (S. Rep. No. 98-225 1983). In order to eliminate unwarranted sentencing
disparities “among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal
conduct,” Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission to adopt and administer the
Guidelines. Part of the SRA of 1984, the Guidelines were applied to all federal offenses committed
after November 1, 1987, and prohibited courts from using race, sex, national origin, creed, religion,
and socioeconomic status in sentencing decisions.
Under the Guidelines, federal district court judges assign each crime to one of 43 offense
levels, and assign each defendant to one of six criminal history categories. The more serious the
offense and the greater the harm associated with the offense, the higher the base offense level. For
example, trespass offenses are assigned a base offense level of four, while kidnapping is assigned a
base offense level of 32. From a base offense level, the final offense level is calculated by adjusting
for applicable offense and defendant characteristics. Relevant adjustments under Chapter Two of
the Guidelines include the amount of loss involved in the offense, use of a firearm, and the age
or condition of the victim. Chapter Three allows for further adjustments based on aggravating or
mitigating factors, such as obstruction of justice or a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.
The criminal history category reflects the frequency and severity of a defendant’s prior criminal
convictions, predictive of recidivism risk. To determine a defendant’s criminal history category,
a judge adds points for prior sentences in the federal system, 50 state systems, all territories and
foreign or military courts. For example, three points are added for each prior sentence of impris-
onment exceeding one year and one month, and two points are added for each prior sentence of
imprisonment of at least 60 days and less than one year and one month. Two points are also added
if the defendant committed the instant offense under any criminal justice sentence. These points
are then converted into a criminal history category.
The intersection of the final offense level and criminal history category yields a fairly narrow
Guidelines recommended sentencing range, where the top of the range exceeds the bottom by the
greater of either six months or 25% (See Online Appendix Table A1 for the Guidelines sentencing
chart). If a judge determines that there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances that warrant a
departure from the Guidelines, she would have to justify her reasons for departure to the appellate
court, but in general the Guidelines were treated as sufficiently mandatory prior to Booker. Be-
fore Booker, judges could only consider factors such as a defendant’s age, education, employment
history, in deciding the sentence length for within range sentences. After sentencing, the govern-
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ment is permitted to appeal a sentence resulting in a departure below the Guidelines range, and the
defendant can appeal an upward departure.3
II.B. Challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines Regime
The constitutionality of mandatory sentencing guidelines was first questioned in reference to
the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines. In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),
the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial prohibited judges from
increasing a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on facts other than those
decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, Washington’s mandatory sentencing
guidelines were struck down. Shortly after, the reasoning of Blakely was applied to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines.
In United States v. Booker, the mandatory Guidelines were also found unconstitutional under
the Sixth Amendment. The Booker ruling, however, did not apply to mandatory minimum sen-
tences enacted by Congress. Rather than invalidating the Guidelines, the Supreme Court held that
the Guidelines would be “effectively advisory,” as opposed to mandatory. The Court explained that
“district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take
them into account when sentencing.”
In the aftermath of Booker, circuit courts reached a consensus that sentencing must begin with
the calculation of the applicable Guidelines range. Today, after a sentencing judge has calculated
the Guidelines range, she must consider seven factors under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) before imposition
of punishment: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant, (2) the need for the sentence imposed, (3) the kinds of sentences available, (4) the
kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established, (5) any pertinent policy statement issued
by the Sentencing Commission, (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, and (7) the need
to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions further weakened the effect of the Guidelines on crim-
inal sentencing by reducing the degree of appellate review. In Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338 (2007), the Court held that a sentence within the Guidelines recommended range could be
presumed “reasonable” because a “judge who imposes a sentence within the range recommended
by the Guidelines thus makes a decision that is fully consistent with the Commission’s judgment
in general.” In Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), the Court held that federal appeals courts
3There are numerous other ways in which Congress has attempted to limit unwarranted disparities in sentencing.
Beginning in 1984, and subsequently 1986 and 1988, Congress enacted a series of mandatory minimum statutes
directed at drug and firearms offenses. In 2003, Congress also passed the PROTECT Act to curtail judicial departures
due to a concern that the standard for appellate review of departures had led to undesirably high rates of departures for
child sex offenses.
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could not presume that a sentence outside the range recommended by the Guidelines was unrea-
sonable. Concurrent with the Gall decision, the Court in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S.
85 (2007), held that federal district court judges have the discretion to impose sentences outside
the recommended Guidelines range due to policy disagreements with the Sentencing Commission,
such as the disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses - the so-called “100-to-1
ratio.”
III. DATA
This paper utilizes data from three sources: (1) the United States Sentencing Commission, (2)
the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, and (3) the Federal Judicial Center. I describe
each dataset in turn.
III.A. United States Sentencing Commission
I use data from the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) on records of all federal
offenders sentenced pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements of the SRA of
1984 in fiscal years 1994-2009 (October 1, 1993 - September 30, 2009).4 These data include
demographic, Guidelines application, and sentencing information on federal defendants, but de-
fendant and judge identifiers are redacted. This information is obtained from numerous documents
on every offender: Indictment, Presentence Report, Report on the Sentencing Hearing, Written
Plea Agreement (if applicable), and Judgment of Conviction.
Demographic variables include defendant’s race, gender, age, citizenship status, educational
attainment, and number of dependents. Data is also provided on the primary offense type, with
a total of 35 offense categories. Offense level variables include the base offense level, the base
offense level after Chapter Two adjustments and the final offense level after Chapter Three ad-
justments. Criminal history variables include whether the defendant has a prior criminal record,
and whether armed career criminal status, or career offender status is applied, which are subject to
mandatory minimums. Data is also provided on the total number of criminal history points applied
and the final criminal history category.
For each offender, there is a computed Guidelines range, and a Guidelines range adjusted for
applicable mandatory minimums. From these variables, I construct indicator variables for above
range and below range departures from the Guidelines, as well as months of departure, conditional
on an above or below range departure.5 Information is also provided on whether the offense carries
4Over 90% of felony defendants in the federal criminal justice system are sentenced pursuant to the SRA of 1984
and all cases are assessed to be constitutional.
5Technically, deviations from the Guidelines range are no longer “departures” after the Guidelines became advi-
sory, but I use this term to maintain consistency.
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a mandatory minimum sentence under various statutes, and whether departures from the statutory
minimum are granted, either under a substantial assistance motion or application of the safety
valve (described in greater detail later). Sentencing characteristics include the district court in
which sentencing occurred (94 total), in addition to the sentencing month and year.6 Data is also
available on whether a case is settled by plea agreement or trial. Sentencing outcomes include
incarceration or probation, sentence length, receipt of supervised release, and length of supervised
release.
I apply several sample restrictions. First, I drop individuals sentenced to life imprisonment,
about 0.5% of the sample. Second, I drop individuals with missing or invalid criminal records
(offense level, criminal history category, and offense type), about 6% of the sample. Third, I
exclude individuals missing race, about 0.2% of the sample.
Table I presents summary statistics for the main variables from the USSC data. Panel A indi-
cates that 83% of the defendants in the dataset are incarcerated versus receiving probation. Those
who are not incarcerated serve an average of 29 months of probation. The average unconditional
sentence length is approximately 49 months. Conditional on incarceration, the average sentence
length is 57 months. Approximately 30% of cases carry a statutory minimum and only 4% of cases
are settled by trial. After imprisonment, defendants serve an average of 38 months of supervised
release.
In the dataset, 32% of defendants are white, 26% black and 38% Hispanic.7 About 32% of
the defendants are non U.S. citizens. Defendants have on average 1.6 dependents, and almost a
majority have less than a high school degree. Over 85% of the defendants are male. Defendants
are approximately 34 years of age. Most of the defendants have had some previous interaction
with the criminal justice system, as 75% have some prior criminal history. The most common
offense is drug trafficking, followed by immigration, fraud, firearms, and larceny. Drug trafficking
represents about 39% of the cases, followed by immigration offenses which comprise 18% of the
cases. In terms of Guidelines range calculations, defendants have an average final criminal history
score of 2.36, and a final offense level of 18.84. This criminal history category and offense level
combination yield an average Guidelines recommended range of 30-37 months in prison.
III.B. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) provides sentencing data obtained
through FOIA requests. The data do not contain defendant demographics, offense characteristics,
6USSC data prior to 2004 actually includes information on the exact sentencing day, but this variable is not available
in later years.
7The remaining race category is defendants classified as “other” race, which is comprised primarily of Native
Americans.
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and Guidelines application information, but defendants are linked to the sentencing judge. To
link defendant and crime characteristics to sentencing judge, I match sentencing records from the
USSC to data provided by TRAC. By district court, matching is conducted on several key variables:
sentencing year, sentencing month, offense type, sentence length in months, probation length in
months, amount of monetary fine, whether the case ended by trial or plea agreement, and whether
the case resulted in a life sentence. For defendants sentenced prior to fiscal year 2004, I also match
on exact sentencing day.8 I successfully match over 90% of all cases from fiscal years 2000-2009.
III.C. Federal Judicial Center
To provide information on judge characteristics, I match the USSC and TRAC combined data
to judge biographical data from the Federal Judicial Center. Federal district judges are Article III
judges who serve life term tenures. New appointments are generally made when a judge retires
or dies.9 As of the current day, there are a total of 678 Article III district judgeships. The largest
district court is the Southern District of New York with 28 authorized judgeships. The majority of
other district courts have between two to seven judgeships.
I obtain information on judge race, gender, political affiliation of appointing president, and
commission year. Applying the same sample restrictions as described in Section III.A, the final
matched dataset consists of 440,025 cases resulting in prison sentences from fiscal years 2000-
2009.10 This unique dataset permits an examination of judicial demographic characteristics on
sentencing practices in the wake of increased judicial discretion via Booker. Panel B of Table I
presents summary statistics on this matched dataset. Of judges active between 2000-2009, 19%
are female, and over 75% are white. Black judges represent approximately 8% of the share of all
judges. Judges appointed by Democratic presidents represent 44% of all judges.
IV. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF JUDICIAL SENTENCING
This section provides a very simplified framework for analyzing judicial sentencing, similar to
that used by Gennaioli and Shleifer (2008). The framework considers two countervailing forces on
judicial sentencing: (1) a judge’s preferences for sentencing according to her tastes and (2) costs
associated with exercising discretion.
Consider a judge who is assigned to a defendant with a true harm or risk of recidivism, r.
Let the Guidelines sentence for a defendant with risk r be s∗(r). Now suppose that the judge
8Results are unchanged matching on the same variables across all years.
9On a few occasions, Congress has also increased the number of judgeships within a district in response to changing
population or caseload.
10The Federal Judicial Center does not collect demographic information on judges in 3 districts: Guam, Virgin
Islands, and Northern Mariana Islands.
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would prefer to sentence the defendant to sj(r), such that sj(r) 6= s∗(r). The judge may prefer to
impose sj(r) because sentencing a defendant in a particular way can increase the judge’s utility by
advancing her political and ideological goals, or other personal goals.11
Assume that a judge suffers disutility from sentencing s 6= sj(r), such that a judge who sen-
tences s experiences loss of
L =
(s− sj(r))2
2
If judges have sentencing preferences that deviate from the Guidelines and were left uncon-
strained, a judge would set s = sj(r) and one would likely observe large inter-judge disparities in
sentencing. Consistent with this prediction, Posner (2005) suggests that the large variances in fed-
eral sentences prior to the adoption of the Guidelines were likely due to differing judicial attitudes
towards personal responsibility and deterrence.
However, various mechanisms constrain judges from deviating from recommended sentences.
For one, mandatory rule-based sentencing under a Guidelines regime constrains judge sentencing.
Another constraint on judge decision-making comes from appellate review. A high reversal rate
is not only administratively burdensome, but also potentially harms a trial judge’s prospects for
promotion to the appeals court (Posner 2005).
Thus, a judge sentencing away from the Guidelines recommended sentence also incurs a cost
associated with reversal. Assume that pre Booker, a judge faced a cost C = 0 if s = s∗(r) and
C = ∞ if s 6= s∗(r). Essentially, the Guidelines were treated as mandatory, implying very high
costs to exercising discretion. In this pre Booker regime, one would see very little deviation from
the Guidelines.12
After Booker, the Guidelines were no longer binding, but judges still faced the prospect of
reversal upon appellate review. To capture this idea, assume that the cost of exercising discretion
in the post Booker regime is
C = p
(sj(r)− s∗(r))2
2
where p is the probability of appellate reversal and (s
j(r)−s∗(r))2
2
is the reputational cost associated
with reversal.
Given a defendant with true risk r, a judge therefore sets a sentence s(r) to minimize (s−s
j(r))2
2
+
p (s
j(r)−s∗(r))2
2
, setting
s(r) =
sj(r) + ps∗(r)
1 + p
Thus, the judge imposes a sentence that is a weighted average of his ideal and the Guidelines
1165% of federal district judges in a 2010 USSC survey indicated that they thought the departure policy statements
in the Guidelines Manual were too restrictive, indicating that many judges prefer to deviate from the Guidelines.
12The rate of departure from the Guidelines was less than 15% in the early 1990s.
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recommended sentence. If p = 0, he sets the sentence to his ideal. The greater the probability of
reversal, p, the more the judge sentences the defendant closer to the Guidelines sentence.
From a Guidelines regime to Booker, the total cost of exercising discretion C falls substantially
for judges who want to depart from the Guidelines sentence. Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough later
reduced the level of appellate review from de novo to substantial abuse of discretion, intuitively
lowering p, the probability of appellate reversal. Indeed, the probability of reversal on sentencing
matters fell from 36% in 2006 (under de novo review), to 26% in 2008 (under abuse of discretion
review).13 Thus, as the cost of exercising discretion falls after Booker, the model predicts that
judges would immediately impose sentences that deviate from the Guidelines sentence. As the
probability of appellate reversal falls under Rita, Gall, Kimbrough, the costs of discretion fall even
more, and one would expect to see further deviations from the Guidelines. If the probability of
appellate reversal under de novo review was a binding constraint on judges, one would expect to
see relatively larger changes in sentencing after Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough than in the immediate
aftermath of Booker.
V. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
The Booker case was decided on January 12, 2005, and applied immediately to all future cases
and prior cases that had not reached sentencing. This paper exploits the timing of this decision
to estimate the effect of increased judicial discretion on racial disparities in sentencing outcomes.
I use a differences-in-differences (DD) methodology to compare the sentence disparities between
similar defendants within a district court before and after Booker.
The main specification is of the form:
Yijkdtm = β0 + β1 ∗Booker ∗Racei + β2 ∗Booker + β3 ∗Race+ β4 ∗Xi + β5 ∗ Zi
+Guideijk +Offtypei + γd + δt + γd ∗ δt + λm + ijkdtm (1)
where Yijkdtm is a sentencing outcome for defendant i, with criminal history category j and offense
level k, sentenced in district court d in year t and month m. Main outcomes include sentence length
measured in months, a binary indicator for whether the defendant was sentenced above range (such
that the sentence length is greater than the prescribed Guidelines maximum), a binary indicator
for below range sentencing (sentence length less than the prescribed Guidelines minimum), and
sentence length conditional on above, below, or within range sentencing. Additional outcomes
include a binary indicator for incarceration, probation length, receipt of supervised release, term of
supervised release, application of a statutory minimum, and departures from statutory minimums.
13I calculate rate of appellate reversals using yearly data on the universe of criminal appeals from the USSC. Rever-
sal is defined as all reversals and remands on appeals arising out of sentencing issues.
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The main coefficient of interest is β1, which captures the impact of Booker on racial gaps in
sentencing outcomes. Booker is an indicator variable for defendants sentenced after the Booker
decision.14 Racei is a dummy variable for defendant i ’s race: white, black, Hispanic, or other.
Xi comprises a vector of demographic characteristics of the defendant including gender, age, age
squared, educational attainment (less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college
graduate), number of dependents, and citizenship status. Zi, an indicator variable for whether the
offense carries a mandatory minimum.15
Guideijk includes dummy variables for criminal history category j and offense level k, and
each unique combination of criminal history category and offense level. The interaction captures
differential sentencing tendencies at each unique cell of the Guidelines grid (258 total). To proxy
for underlying offense seriousness and all aggravating and mitigating factors, I control for final
offense level. I also control for final criminal history category. Offtypei is a dummy variable for
offense type.
The specification also includes district court fixed effects (γd), sentencing year fixed effects (δt),
and sentencing month fixed effects (λm). I also control for district by year fixed effects to control
for district trends over time. As a robustness check, race specific linear trends are included to ac-
count for preexisting trending differences in sentencing outcomes between defendants of different
races. All standard errors are clustered at the district court level to account for serial correlation.
To analyze the differential sentencing practices of certain types of judges, I use a differences-
in-differences-in-differences (DDD) methodology. The DDD methodology captures how judges
differ in their relative treatment of similar black and white defendants in response to increased
judicial discretion, compared to other judges within the same district court. Because cases are
randomly assigned to judges within a district court, judge identifiers allow one to compare judges
within the same court, capturing judge differences in sentencing rather than different caseloads.16
I identify the sources of increasing racial disparities post Booker using a specification of the
form:
Yijkdtm = β0 + α1 ∗ Judgei ∗Racei ∗Booker + α2 ∗ Judgei ∗Racei + α3 ∗ Judgei ∗Booker
+β1 ∗Booker ∗Racei + β2 ∗Booker + β3 ∗Race+ β4 ∗Xi + β5 ∗ Zi +Guideijk
+Offtypei + γd + δt + γd ∗ δt + λm + ijkdtm
(2)
14For defendants sentenced in January 2005, the USSC data contains a variable denoting whether the case was heard
prior to or after the Booker decision.
15Controlling for the application of a mandatory minimum is important because of large differences by race. More-
over, the application of mandatory minimums is not endogenous to Booker (See Table VI).
16According to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, “The majority of courts use some variation of
a random drawing.” I also test for random assignment in Section VI.F.
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where Judgei includes judicial demographics such as race, gender, political affiliation, an indicator
for pre vs. post Guidelines appointment, and an indicator for pre vs. post Booker appointment.
The coefficient α1 captures the impact of particular judicial characteristics on racial disparities in
the wake of Booker.
VI. RESULTS
VI.A. Sentence Length
Figure I presents graphical evidence of trends in sentence length by defendant race in the raw
data. Figure I indicates no preexisting trending differences in sentence lengths across defendants
of different races. However, the trend in the gap in sentence length between black and white
defendants changes post Booker as sentence lengths for black and white defendants diverge. The
evidence is even more striking excluding cases with mandatory minimums, where it is apparent
that sentence lengths for white defendants decrease post Booker, while black sentence lengths
continue to rise, increasing the racial disparities in sentence length.
Table II presents the regression results for the impact of increased judicial discretion via Booker
on disparities in sentence length. The coefficients on defendant demographics are consistent with
prior findings regarding disparities in sentencing. On average, black offenders face an approx-
imately 3 month longer sentence length than comparable white offenders, who are the omitted
category. Hispanic offenders receive over a 1 month longer prison sentence compared to similar
white offenders. Additionally, non US citizens face about a 1.5 month longer prison sentence com-
pared to US citizens. Defendants with greater educational attainment receive shorter months in
prison, compared to defendants with less than a high school degree (the omitted category). I also
find large sentencing disparities by gender. Female defendants receive over 5 months less in prison
compared to male offenders. Additionally, defendant age is positively correlated with sentence
length, while number of dependents is negatively associated with sentence length. The application
of a mandatory minimum on average results in a 23 month longer sentence.
The coefficients on the Booker indicator interacted with defendant race suggest growing racial
disparities post Booker. Column 1 suggests that black offenders receive an approximately 2 month
longer sentence after Booker compared to white offenders, over a 70% increase in the racial gap in
sentence length, and a 4% increase in the average sentence length for all offenders. Post Booker,
Hispanics offenders receive about a 1.5 month longer sentence compared to similar white offend-
ers, an approximately 3% increase in the average sentence length for all offenders.
I present several robustness checks in Table II. Column 2 controls for possible differential
effects of the PROTECT Act on racial disparities in sentencing outcomes. Column 3 accounts
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for potential effects of the 2007 Rita/Gall/Kimbrough decisions on racial disparities.17 Column 3
indicates that while racial disparities first emerge in the immediate aftermath of Booker, they grow
larger following Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough, suggesting that judges are particularly responsive to
more deferential appellate review.
Column 4 includes race specific linear trends. Column 5 includes race trends and adds a full set
of time effects - sentencing month interacted with sentencing year. Finally, in Online Appendix Ta-
ble A3, I replicate specification (4) for ten placebo periods prior to Booker. Table A3 indicates that
the changes in racial disparities post Booker are much larger than those around placebo periods.
Overall, these alternate specifications indicate that increases in racial disparities in the aftermath
of Booker are highly robust.
While racial disparities in sentence length have increased as a whole, a more disaggregated
analysis reveals that the growing racial disparities after Booker do not appear uniformly across all
offenses. Online Appendix Table A4 presents results on sentence lengths disaggregated into the
most prevalent seven offenses, which comprise 84% of all offenses in the dataset. Racial dispari-
ties increase significantly among defendants convicted of drug trafficking offenses, controlling for
primary type of drug, and fraud offenses. Black and Hispanic defendants convicted of these of-
fenses receive 1.5-2 months longer in prison compared to their white counterparts in the aftermath
of Booker.
VI.B. Departures from the Guidelines
Table III presents results on how Booker impacted departures from the Guidelines. Column
1 replicates specification (4) of the sentence length results from Table II. Column 2 indicates that
post Booker, black defendants are sentenced at greater rates above range than white defendants,
approximately 2%. However, conditional on above range sentencing, black defendants receive
about the same number of months above range compared to white defendants.
Column 4 shows that below range departures increase generally post Booker by over 8% for
all defendants. The high rate of below range departures following Booker may be the result of
judicial discontent with the mandatory Guidelines regime. In a USSC survey of federal district
judges in 2002, 30-40% of respondents stated that they believed that the Guidelines avoided un-
warranted sentencing disparity only "Sometimes" or "Rarely." In a 2010 USSC survey of federal
district judges after Booker, 65% of respondents indicated that they thought the departure policy
statements in the Guidelines Manual were too restrictive.
While below range departures increase for all defendants in the aftermath of Booker, black
17I control for possible differential effects of the PROTECT Act and Rita/Gall/Kimbrough by interacting indicators
for these court decisions with defendant race dummies. Although not shown in Table II, the passage of the PROTECT
Act did not change racial disparities in sentencing. This finding is also confirmed by Freeborn and Hartmann (2010).
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offenders are significantly less likely to be sentenced below range compared to white defendants.
PostBooker, black defendants are 1.6% less likely to be sentenced below range compared to similar
white defendants. These results on below range departures are robust to excluding cases with
statutory minimums.18
Finally, the last two columns indicate that rates of within range sentencing generally decreased
by over 9% post Booker, but not differentially for black and white offenders. However, conditional
on being sentenced within range, black offenders receive a 0.9 month longer sentence compared
to their white counterparts post Booker. Recall that prior to Booker, judges were generally not
allowed to consider factors such as defendant age, education, physical or mental problems, family,
etc. in making sentencing decisions, except for within range sentences. The finding that disparities
increase after Booker even for the subset of within range sentences suggests that disparities are not
solely driven by the ability of judges to consider various unobservable factors in the aftermath of
Booker.
Hispanic defendants face similar increases in disparities in departures from the Guidelines com-
pared to similar white defendants. After Booker, Hispanic defendants are about 0.7% more likely
to be sentenced above range, 1.8% less likely to be sentenced within range, and conditional on
being sentenced within range, receive a 0.3 month longer sentence compared to white defendants.
Thus, it appears that the increased racial disparities in sentencing between defendants occurs in the
differential application of upward and downward departures, as well as disparate sentence lengths
for within range sentences.19
VI.C. Robustness Checks for Increasing Racial Disparities
The previous results identify growing racial disparities in sentence length and departures from
the Guidelines after Booker. One may be concerned that the increase in racial disparities after
Booker is driven by harsher treatment of other characteristics that are associated with black defen-
dants. For instance, if black defendants disproportionately have lower educational attainment, and
judges take a harsher sentencing stance on less educated defendants post Booker, racial disparities
may mechanically increase. To account for possible disparities driven by other demographic and
18Although not presented here, the differential rates of below range departures are not driven by government spon-
sored departures, but attributable to judicial departures.
19An analysis of other sentence outcomes is presented in Online Appendix Table A5. Black offenders are gener-
ally more likely to be incarcerated compared to white offenders, but the differential in incarceration rates does not
change post Booker. Probation lengths by defendant race do not change significantly post Booker. However, length
of supervised release (served after imprisonment), changes substantially. Black defendants generally receive almost
2 months longer of supervised release, compared to similar white defendants. Post Booker, black and Hispanic de-
fendants receive about 1.5 months less of supervised release compared to white defendants.The divergent changes in
racial disparities in sentence length and supervised release length after Booker may be a result of judges replacing
actual sentences for supervised release time for black and Hispanic defendants.
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crime characteristics, I include full interactions between the Booker indicator and a variety of rele-
vant observables. In column 1 of Table IV, I replicate column 1 from Table II to show the baseline
results. In column 2, I account for potential disparities post Booker based on defendant citizenship
status, educational attainment, number of dependents, gender and age. In column 3, I account for
possible disparities attributable to final offense level and criminal history category. Finally, column
4 also accounts for disparities attributable to offense type.
Note that the significance of the coefficients on Booker interacted with defendant race remained
unchanged in all 4 columns but falls in magnitude. Racial differences in sentencing are not the only
disparities that emerge after Booker. The results from Table IV reveal growing disparities among
defendants of different educational attainments. After Booker, defendants with some college and
those with a college degree are sentenced to almost 2 months less, compared to their less educated
counterparts. Furthermore, defendants with additional dependents face a slightly lower prison
sentence compared to defendants with fewer dependents post Booker. In contrast, disparities do
not increase by gender, age or citizenship status.
Fully accounting for disparities due to defendant offense level and criminal history category
reveals additional disparities post Booker. The coefficients on offense level interacted with the
Booker indicator are omitted because none are statistically significant at the 10% level, suggesting
that judges do not differentially sentence defendants with different offense severity post Booker.
However, judges sentence defendants with higher levels of prior criminal activity more harshly
post Booker. After Booker, defendants in criminal history categories 2, 3, 4, and 5 face an approx-
imately 1.5 month longer sentence, compared to first time offenders in criminal history category
1. When column 4 includes additional interactions with offense type, none of the coefficients are
significant and are thus excluded, suggesting that judges are not sentencing differentially across
offenses in the aftermath of Booker.
To further test the robustness of the results, I explore whether increasing racial disparities may
be mechanically driven by black defendants being less likely to show remorse for their crimes. I
capture this through the court’s decision to reduce a defendant’s offense level by either two or three
points through the acceptance of responsibility provision. I find that lack of remorse as proxied
by acceptance of responsibility cannot explain the growing racial disparities in the aftermath of
Booker (See Online Appendix Table A6). Overall, these results suggest that racial disparities are
robust to differential treatment of defendants by other characteristics in the aftermath of Booker.
Despite increasing disparities by educational attainment, family structure, and criminal history,
racial disparities persist.
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VI.D. How Constraining is Appellate Review? Evidence from Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough
Booker changed the legal landscape by invalidating the mandatory nature of the Guidelines,
but the series of Supreme Court decisions that followed also changed the standard of appellate
review. In the first two and half years after Booker, judges were no longer bound to the Guidelines,
but still faced a high level of appellate scrutiny. Beginning in late 2007, the Rita presumption
of reasonableness for within range sentences provided judges with a safe harbor from appellate
scrutiny. Gall and Kimbrough removed the presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside
the Guidelines range, further reducing the probability of reversal.
These differential changes in the increase in judicial discretion yield insights into the mecha-
nisms to which judges respond. If judges are greatly bound by the rule-based nature of the Guide-
lines, one would expect to see large increases in disparities immediately after Booker. If judges
are constrained by appellate review, the advisory nature of the Guidelines coupled with strict stan-
dards of review may still restrict judicial sentencing. Instead, judges constrained by appellate
review would be most free to deviate in the aftermath of Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough.
To capture the dynamics in the aftermath of Booker, I replicate specification (1) using leads
and lags in six month intervals for the five years prior and post Booker. These leads and lags are
then interacted with defendant race to capture the change in disparities in that specific time period
compared to the base period (1994-1999).
Figure II presents the results from a dynamic differences-in-differences specification where the
dependent variable is sentence length in months.20 Figure II graphs the coefficients for the leads
and lags interacted with a black race dummy, along with corresponding 95% confidence intervals,
and shows a clear increasing sentencing gap between black and white defendants. The lack of a
significant gap between black and white defendants in the five years prior to Booker suggests that
preexisting trends cannot explain growing racial disparities.
Starting about two and a half years after Booker, black defendants appear to face a 2.5 month
longer sentence compared to their white counterparts, and the sentencing disparity continues to rise
over time. By four years after Booker, the sentencing gap increases to 4.4 months, almost a 10%
increase in the average sentence length. (See Online Appendix Table A7 for results in table format).
The fact that racial disparities are not significant in the immediate aftermath of Booker suggests
that de novo review may have still been a binding constraint on judicial sentencing, even though
the Guidelines were rendered advisory. The appearance of rising racial disparities approximately
two and a half years after Booker coincide with Rita, Gall and Kimbrough, indicating that more
deferential appellate review greatly affects judicial sentencing behavior.
Figure III captures the pattern in departures from the Guidelines, where the dependent variable
20Although not presented here, results for Hispanic defendants compared to white defendants show a similar, but
less pronounced trend.
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is an indicator variable for an above range departure or below range departure. The gap in above
range sentencing for black and white defendants appears starting around two and a half years after
Booker, persists and grows larger. By five years after the Booker decision, black defendants are
over 3.5% more likely to be sentenced above range compared to their white counterparts. Similarly,
the gap in below range sentencing starts around three years afterBooker and persists throughout the
rest of the period, with black defendants over 5% less likely to be sentenced below range compared
to white defendants four years after Booker. Again, racial disparities in the rate of departures
became more pronounced after Rita, Gall and Kimbrough, suggesting that judges are particularly
responsive to standards of appellate review. I present evidence in the next section suggesting that
the growing racial disparities are also attributable to the increasing number of judges appointed
post Booker.
VI.E. Potential Threats to Identification
There are three primary threats to identification. First, the results may be biased if unob-
servables that affect sentencing decisions change differentially by defendant race in the wake of
Booker. I test for this potential concern by analyzing the extent to which observable offense and
defendant characteristics differ in the post Booker period. Black defendants sentenced after Booker
are more likely to be male, 0.7 years younger, and less likely to be non U.S. citizens compared to
their white counterparts (See Online Appendix Table A8). While these changes are significant, the
magnitudes are very small. Moreover, as shown later, younger defendants who are U.S. citizens
receive relatively lower sentences compared to otherwise similar, older non U.S. citizens. Thus,
any unobservable changes correlated with these demographics would bias downwards the findings.
I also find that there is no differential change in criminal history measures by defendant race after
Booker. If anything, black defendants have lower base offense levels, Chapter 2 adjusted offense
levels and final offense levels after Booker compared to their white counterparts, suggesting that
black defendants may commit relatively less severe crimes compared to similar white offenders
(See Online Appendix Table A9).
A second threat to identification arises if changes in offense levels are endogenous to Booker
with no change in “real” offense severity. If judges are less concerned with deflating white defen-
dants’ offense levels in order to justify lower sentences, relatively lower offense levels for black
defendants compared to white defendants after Booker may mechanically generate the appearance
of racial disparities. To address this potential endogeneity, previous researchers have either ex-
cluded any control for offense severity or controlled for base offense level, rather than final offense
level (Fischman and Schanzenbach 2012). Excluding any measure of offense level as a control is
highly problematic given large underlying changes in case composition by race throughout the time
period (Starr and Rehavi 2012), but the main results in Table III are highly robust to controlling
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for base offense level (Online Appendix Table A10).21
However, my preferred approach is to test the robustness of my results using a more plausibly
exogenous measure of offense severity - the arrest offense. Using data from the U.S. Marshals’
Service, the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
and the Sentencing Commission, and linking files provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, I
match federal defendants from the arrest through sentencing stage from 1994-2009.22 Through this
linked dataset, I obtain for each sentenced offender a highly detailed offense type determined at the
time of arrest, exogenous to the sentencing stage.23 In column 1 of Online Appendix Table A11,
I replicate the main results in Table II on this subset of linkable cases. In column 2 of Table A11,
I replicate the results in Table II controlling for arrest offense rather than measures of Guidelines
offense level. Table A11 indicates that results are highly robust to controlling for arrest offense,
indicating that recent increases in racial disparities are not driven by endogenous offense level
determinations.
Finally, a back of the envelope calculation suggests that even pure manipulations in offense
levels cannot explain the majority of increases in racial disparities. Table A9 indicates that white
offenders’ base offense levels increase by approximately 0.2 relative to similar black offenders
after Booker. In the dataset, a one point increase in base offense level is associated with an average
3 month increase in sentence length. Thus, even assuming that base offense levels are changing
without any corresponding changes in “real” offense severity, only a racial disparity of 0.6 months
can be explained by this mechanical artifact, less than 30% of the increase in racial disparity
following Booker.
A third potential threat to the identification is if Booker is associated with changes in selec-
tion in the types of defendants that reach the sentencing stage. For instance, if prosecutors dis-
proportionately drop or dismiss charges against marginal black defendants, the remaining black
defendants at the sentencing stage might receive longer sentences compared to similar white of-
fenders. To address potential changes in selection prior to the sentencing stage, I test the likelihood
of guilty pleas, dropped charges, and deferred prosecutions against black defendants compared to
similar white defendants after Booker using data on all federal arrests and bookings from 1994-
21Furthermore, differential changes in offense levels by race after Booker do not appear across the board. To test
whether potential endogeneity in base and final offense levels drive the results, I analyze the subset of sentences which
have offense levels that are less likely prone to manipulation because they are relatively low to begin with - those
involving offenders in the lowest criminal history category, who represent 50% of defendants. In results not presented,
there is no relative change in base or final offense levels for offenders in the lowest criminal history category and I find
large and significant increases in racial disparities after Booker, suggesting that endogenous changes in offense levels
without a real change in offense severity are unlikely to fully explain the increase in racial disparities.
22Descriptions of the data and linking files can be found at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/NACJD/guides/fjsp.html.
23The linked dataset does not provide a separate race category for Hispanic defendants, so results using this dataset
compare white and black defendants.
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2009.24 Online Appendix Table A12 suggests no significant changes in the rates at which black
defendants plead guilty, or the likelihood of dropped charges or deferred prosecution, suggesting
no significant changes in selection prior to sentencing.25
VI.F. Free at Last? Effects of Judicial Sentencing Philosophies and Experience
While disparities in sentencing outcomes increased in the wake of Booker, the response to in-
creased judicial discretion may differ by judge sentencing philosophies and experience. In partic-
ular, judges appointed before Booker may sentence differently compared to judges appointed after
Booker. Judges with substantial experience sentencing under the mandatory Guidelines regime
may become acculturated to the Guidelines, and less likely to change their sentencing practices in
the aftermath of Booker.
Since Booker, there have been 190 confirmed judicial appointments to US district courts, 93
new judges up to the end of the fiscal sentencing year 2009.26 The judges appointed prior to
2009 were appointed by President George W. Bush, and the remaining judges by President Barack
Obama. However, all Obama appointees began active service following the end of the fiscal year
2009, so this paper cannot identify the sentencing patterns of new Democratic appointed judges.
Within the matched data from 2000-2009, post Booker appointed judges have sentenced a growing
share of criminal defendants, to almost 10% of cases in fiscal year 2009.
Recall that random assignment of cases to judges is necessary in order to compare sentencing
practices of judges within a district court. According to the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, “[t]he majority of courts use some variation of a random drawing” as prescribed by
local court orders. However, random assignment may be violated in some instances. For example,
senior status judges with reduced caseloads may select the type of cases they hear during the year,
and some courts assign certain types of cases to particular judges.
To exclude senior status judges who may not obtain cases through a random assignment pro-
cess, I drop judges who were formally retired prior to 2000, and judges and district courthouses
with annual caseloads of less than 25 cases. To ensure that I only include courthouses with random
assignment of cases, I then test for random assignment by district courthouse using the matched
USSC, TRAC, and Federal Judicial Center data from 2000-2009, for a set of five predetermined
defendant characteristics: gender, age, a black race indicator, number of dependents, and an indi-
cator for less than a high school degree. For each of the five defendant characteristics, I regress
24Data is obtained from the Federal Justice Statistics Program: Arrests and Bookings for Federal Offenses, which
covers all offenders within the custody of the United Marshals Service.
25A deferred prosecution occurs when a prosecutor agrees to not file charges in exchange for the defendant taking
specified actions, such as payment of fines, and continued cooperation during investigation.
26Nine judges were commissioned in 2005, 26 commissioned in 2006, 32 in 2007, and 26 in 2008. Post Booker
appointed judges are now active in 53 district courts, some comprising up to 75% of the active bench within a court.
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the characteristic on district courthouse by sentencing year fixed effects, sentencing month fixed
effects and judge fixed effects. I test the hypothesis of no judge effects (the null hypothesis) using
an F-test for whether the judge fixed effects are equal to zero using seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) following Autor and Houseman (2010). P-values for these tests by district courthouse are
presented in Online Appendix Table A13. I drop all courthouses with F-test p-values less than
0.05, but results are robust to other cutoffs. The subsample of district courts with random case
assignment includes 72 courts representing about 50% of the cases from 2000-2009.27
Table V presents the results, using this subsample of district courts, of specification (2) with an
interaction between defendant race, the Booker indicator, and an indicator variable equal to one for
judges appointed post Booker, in addition to the interaction between defendant race and the Booker
indicator.28 The triple interaction terms measures the different sentencing practices of post Booker
appointed judges on disparities in sentencing, compared to pre Booker judges in the aftermath of
Booker. Column 1 presents results for sentence length. The coefficients of the Booker indicator
interacted with defendant race indicate that racial disparities increase by 1.7 months between black
and white defendants after Booker, but particularly for post Booker appointed judges. These “new”
judges sentence black defendants to an additional 5.4 months in prison compared to similar white
defendants, relative to their colleagues.
Column 2 indicates that all judges are associated with greater rates of above range departures
for black defendants compared to white defendants. Column 4 also indicates different rates of
below range departures for black and white defendants after Booker for all judges. As shown in
column 7, conditional on within range sentencing, all judges sentence black defendants to about 0.6
months longer in prison and Hispanic defendants 0.3 months longer in prison compared to white
defendants. However, the black-white sentence gap for within range sentences is 1.2 months larger
for post Booker judges compared to pre Booker appointed judges. Similarly, the Hispanic-white
sentence gap for within range sentences is 0.8 months larger for post Booker judges compared to
their pre Booker colleagues.
These results indicate that post Booker appointed judges exhibit greater racial disparities in
their sentencing patterns than their pre Booker colleagues, even within the same district court-
house.29 Given that cases are randomly assigned within a district, it is unlikely that these post
Booker judges were assigned cases in which black defendants deserved longer sentences com-
pared to their observably similar white counterparts.30 Furthermore, these results are not driven by
27Online Appendix Table A14 presents the results of the core specification from Table II using the random sample
and full matched sample.
28Note that because all “new” judges were appointed after Booker, in this instance, the triple interaction is identical
to an interaction between defendant race and “new” judge.
29Results are robust to using the full matched sample. See Online Appendix Table A15.
30In results not presented, there are no differences in base or final offense levels between post Booker judges and
pre Booker judges, indicating no differential fact-finding.
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prosecutors being more likely to charge mandatory minimums that trump the minimum Guidelines
sentence when a case is assigned to a post Booker appointed judge.31 Online Appendix Table A16
reveals that post Booker judicial appointees exhibit greater racial disparities than their colleagues
even among cases in which no mandatory minimum was charged or where the mandatory mini-
mum was less than the applicable Guidelines minimum. The black-white sentence gap for within
range sentences is 1.5 months larger for post Booker judges compared to pre Booker appointed
judges.
Moreover, greater racial disparities among post Booker appointed judges cannot be explained
by the fact that these judges were appointed by George W. Bush. In Online Appendix Table A17,
I include all interactions between defendant race, the Booker dummy variable, and an indicator
variable for pre Booker Bush appointees. These controls allow me to compare the sentencing
patterns of post Booker judges to their pre Booker appointed counterparts. The coefficient on
Pre Booker Bush Judge indicates that pre Booker Bush appointees were generally 4% less likely
to sentence below range for all defendants compared to their colleagues, but with no changes in
sentencing practices in the aftermath of Booker. Table A17 also indicates that the coefficients
on Post Booker Judge and its interactions with defendant race remained unchanged from those
presented in Table V, confirming that the sentencing patterns of post Booker appointed judges are
not attributable to the fact that these judges are George W. Bush appointees.
Furthermore, new judges in earlier cohorts also do not sentence differently from their more
experienced colleagues, either before or after Booker. In Online Appendix Table A18, I present
main results including all interactions between defendant race, Booker, and an indicator for new
judges appointed between 2000-2004. Table A18 indicates that judge experience alone cannot ex-
plain inter-judge differences in sentencing, suggesting that the results are not driven by a “new”
judge effect. Instead, the results suggest that exposure to sentencing under a mandatory Guide-
lines regime may drive the differential sentencing patterns between pre and post Booker appointed
judges.
Different sentencing philosophies and practices between judges may not only be driven by
experience under a mandatory Guidelines regime, but other personal preferences. To proxy for
sentencing philosophies, I replicate the regressions in Table V with additional controls for judge
gender, race, political affiliation, and an indicator for whether the judge was appointed prior to
the adoption of the Guidelines. Online Appendix Table A19 shows that post Booker appointed
judges are still the main source of increasing racial disparities. However, other judicial demo-
graphic characteristics are also associated with certain sentencing patterns. Table A19 shows that
female judges sentence all defendants to 2.4 months less in prison after Booker compared to their
31In results not presented, there is no difference in the rate of mandatory minimums, or rate of binding mandatory
minimums, between post Booker judges and pre Booker judges.
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male colleagues. Table A19 also suggests that black judges were about 6% less likely to sentence
defendants of other races below range prior to Booker, but reversed this practice in the aftermath
of Booker. Also striking are the different sentencing practices of Democratic and Republican ap-
pointed judges. Democratic judges are 2.1% more likely than Republican judges to depart down-
wards from the Guidelines, and even conditional on sentencing within range, issue a sentence to
all defendants that is 0.4 months less compared to their Republican colleagues.
VI.G. Response of Prosecutors to Increased Judicial Discretion
While the disparities estimated in this paper do not capture the compounded disparities that
can result at each stage of the criminal process, I conclude by exploring the impact of increased
judicial discretion on changes in prosecutorial decisions to charge mandatory minimums. Given
that Booker left Congressionally-enacted statutory minimums intact, one would not necessarily
expect judicial treatment of mandatory minimums to change in the aftermath of Booker. However,
prosecutors may strategically respond to increased judicial discretion post Booker if they want
to bind judges from departing downwards. After Booker, prosecutors have commented that they
are far less willing to forego charging mandatory minimums because judges ultimately sentence
defendants below the Guidelines minimum.
Table VI presents results suggesting that prosecutorial discretion post Booker has not differ-
entially affected black and white defendants in terms of charging offenses that carry mandatory
minimums, although black and Hispanic defendants are far more likely to receive a mandatory
minimum.32 However, black defendants are significantly more likely to face a binding manda-
tory minimum post Booker compared to white defendants.33 The greater prevalence of binding
mandatory minimums for black defendants in the aftermath of Booker suggests that more statu-
tory minimums are applied to black defendants which exceed the Guidelines recommended sen-
tences compared to similar white offenders. This finding suggests that black defendants may face
statutory minimums that are harsher than the severity of the crime dictates, potentially indicating
prosecutorial disparities post Booker. See Figure IV for graphical evidence of the change in the
rate of statutory minimums, and the rate of binding statutory minimums after Booker.
However, conditional on being convicted of a charge that carries a mandatory minimum, deci-
sions to reduce sentences below the mandatory minimum do not differ significantly by defendant
race after Booker. A judge has some leeway in reducing sentence length for certain drug traffick-
ing offenses under the “safety valve” provision under 18 U.S.C. §3553(f), which allows a judge
32These findings are somewhat consistent with those of Starr and Rehavi (2012) who use a regression discontinuity
design and find a temporary increase in mandatory minimums for black defendants charged immediately after Booker,
but no differential long-term change between black and white defendants after Booker.
33This finding is robust to looking only at drug statutory minimums (the majority of statutory minimums cases) and
controlling for specific drug type.
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to reduce the punishment for low level, first time offenders. Prosecutors also have the ability to
reduce sentences below the mandatory minimum if the defendant offers “substantial assistance”
during another investigation or prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §3553(e).
Column 3 suggest that the application of the safety valve does not change differentially post
Booker, although black defendants are significantly less likely to receive the safety valve com-
pared to similar white offenders for drug trafficking crimes.34 Similarly, column 4 indicates that
government sponsored substantial assistance motions for cases with mandatory minimums do not
change differentially between offenders post Booker, although non white defendants are generally
significantly less likely to receive substantial assistance motions.
While prosecutorial charging decisions likely contribute to increasing racial disparities post
Booker, judicially-induced disparities remain. Following Fischman and Schanzenbach (2012), I
replicate the main results from Table III for the subset of cases in which mandatory minimums
are relatively less likely to apply and bind - offenders in the lowest criminal history category, in
crimes not involving a firearm. Column 1 of Table VII indicates that racial disparities increased
after Booker in this subset of cases, which are less subject to prosecutorial discretion. These results
indicate that prosecutorial charging is unlikely capable of fully explaining recent increases in racial
disparities.
VII. CONCLUSION
After almost two decades of mandatory Guidelines sentencing, the Supreme Court struck down
the Guidelines in United States v. Booker, greatly increasing the degree of judicial discretion. In
subsequent decisions, the Court further increased judicial discretion by reducing the degree of
appellate review and granting judges explicit permission to reject the policies of the Sentencing
Commission.
Using comprehensive data on federal defendants sentenced from 1994-2009, I find evidence
that increased judicial discretion via Booker has led to large and robust increases in racial dis-
parities in sentencing, particularly after periods of reduced appellate scrutiny. By four years after
Booker, the racial sentencing gap increases to 4.4 months, almost a 10% increase in the average
sentence length. I also find that recent increases in racial disparities in sentencing appear to be
larger among judges appointed post Booker, consistent with a story in which judges experienced
with sentencing under rule-based sentencing continue to follow the Guidelines even when given
more discretion. These findings should, however, be interpreted cautiously as they only apply to
new George W. Bush appointees. Barack Obama appointed judges may exhibit different sentenc-
34This finding is also reported in the Sentencing Commission Report (2011) which states that in recent years, white
defendants in drug cases are more frequently granted the safety valve exception compared to other defendants.
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ing patterns. Finally, my results suggest that prosecutors charge black defendants with higher rates
of binding mandatory minimums compared to white defendants after Booker, consistent with pros-
ecutors attempting to bind judges to prevent them from departing downwards from the Guidelines
in response to increased judicial discretion.
Despite the increase in racial disparities in federal sentencing after Booker, 75% of federal
district judges believe that the current advisory regime better achieves the purposes of sentencing
compared to the mandatory Guidelines regime prior to Booker (3%) or the “free at last” regime
before the implementation of the Guidelines (8%). Only 14% of judges believe that a new manda-
tory Guidelines regime that complies with the Sixth Amendment would best achieve sentencing
goals.
The findings in this paper suggest that while most federal district judges prefer the expanded
judicial discretion under the current advisory system to the mandatory Guidelines regime, discre-
tion comes with potentially undesirable consequences. An increase in disparities in the wake of
increased judicial discretion can reflect unwarranted disparities if judicial bias enters into decision-
making. On the other hand, disparities may be warranted if expanded discretion allows judges to
tailor a sentence to the unique circumstances of an offender. For instance, disparities may emerge
if judges are sentencing according to defendant characteristics, both observed and unobserved, that
are correlated with actual recidivism risk.
In fact, recidivism rates are higher among nonwhite offenders, offenders with more extensive
criminal histories and lower educational attainment, and I find that judges sentence these defen-
dants to longer prison terms after Booker. Unconditional on other characteristics, black offenders
are more likely to recidivate (32.8%) than Hispanic offenders (24.3%) and white offenders (16.0%)
(United States Sentencing Commission 2004). Even controlling for basic demographics, criminal
history and severity of offense, blacks are about 3.2 percentage points more likely to recidivate
than white offenders (Kuziemko 2013). Taken with Kuziemko’s finding that an additional month
of time served reduces three-year recidivism by 1.3 percentage points, a judge would sentence
black defendants to an additional 2.4 months in prison to equalize the recidivism rate across ob-
servably similar black and white defendants. This magnitude is consistent with the size of racial
disparities I find in the aftermath of Booker, suggesting that increased disparities may be somewhat
attributable to socially optimal sentencing aimed at reducing recidivism.
On the other hand, recidivism also varies greatly by gender and age after controlling for various
observables, and judges are unresponsive to these variables in the aftermath of Booker, indicating
that judges are not solely sentencing based on actual recidivism risk. Future work could analyze
the extent to which disparities in sentencing are warranted by looking at rates of recidivism in the
federal criminal justice system. More generally, the framework in this paper can be applied to
analyzing the impact of increased discretion on many other actors in the criminal justice system.
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Further work on the interactions of actors at various stages in the criminal process is critical to a
thorough exploration of disparities in the federal criminal justice system.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Guidelines Sentencing Chart
SENTENCING TABLE
(in months of impriso ment)
Criminal History Category  (Criminal History Points)
Offense
Level
I
(0 or 1)
II
(2 or 3)
III
(4, 5, 6)
IV
(7, 8, 9)
V
(10, 11, 12)
VI
(13 or more)
Zone A
1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7
3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9
4 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4-10 6-12
5 0-6 0-6 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15
6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18
7 0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21
8 0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24
Zone B
9 4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27
10 6-12 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30
Zone C
11 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 27-33
12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37
Zone D
13 12-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41
14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46
15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51
16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57
17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63
18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71
19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78
20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87
21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96
22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105
23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115
24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125
25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137
26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150
27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162
28 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 140-175
29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188
30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210
31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235
32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262
33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293
34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327
35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365
36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405
37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life
38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life
39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life
40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
43 life life life life life life
-401- November 1, 2010Notes: Recommended sentence lengths in months.
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Table A2. Sentence Length in Months - Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence
Booker*Black 2.311*** 2.514*** 1.355*** 2.588*** 2.340***
(0.683) (0.575) (0.309) (0.658) (0.595)
Booker*Hispanic 1.466*** 1.830*** 1.695*** 1.681*** 1.673***
(0.487) (0.450) (0.356) (0.466) (0.449)
Booker*Other 1.848 1.491 2.249*** 2.927** 2.646***
(1.149) (0.932) (0.735) (1.137) (0.983)
Black 2.885*** 3.555*** 0.577*** 4.501*** 2.680***
(0.422) (0.344) (0.190) (0.474) (0.361)
Hispanic 0.862* 1.596*** -0.0824 0.829 0.863*
(0.478) (0.410) (0.267) (0.530) (0.455)
Other 1.781 1.140 0.474 2.909*** 1.079
(1.200) (1.036) (0.591) (1.022) (1.090)
Booker -2.939*** -3.232*** -2.126*** -1.340 -3.103***
(1.069) (0.991) (0.709) (1.206) (1.015)
Non US Citizen 1.366*** 1.584*** 0.364 -0.176 1.445***
(0.495) (0.454) (0.304) (0.557) (0.449)
HS Grad -0.369 -0.526*** -0.225** -0.0568 -0.554***
(0.236) (0.182) (0.0877) (0.240) (0.182)
Some College -1.523*** -1.790*** -0.752*** -0.644** -1.624***
(0.285) (0.176) (0.117) (0.301) (0.178)
College Grad -2.222*** -2.742*** -1.010*** 0.335 -1.882***
(0.489) (0.225) (0.175) (0.355) (0.235)
# Dependents -0.123 -0.149*** -0.110*** -0.106* -0.140***
(0.136) (0.0450) (0.0252) (0.0598) (0.0439)
Female -5.347*** -5.502*** -2.633*** -7.139*** -5.416***
(0.595) (0.458) (0.223) (0.656) (0.498)
Age 0.134** 0.168*** 0.255*** 0.328*** 0.138***
(0.0622) (0.0394) (0.0255) (0.0647) (0.0377)
Age2 -0.00125 -0.00192*** -0.00267*** -0.00216*** -0.00139***
(0.000757) (0.000443) (0.000304) (0.000674) (0.000423)
Mandatory Min 23.89*** 34.25*** 22.92***
(1.994) (2.135) (1.773)
Mandatory Min Length 0.00609***
(0.00135)
Observations 552,524 679,159 440,930 455,203 678,960
R-squared 0.650 0.732 0.771 0.642 0.741
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. Column 1 presents results for all sentences including life
sentences top coded at 470 months. Column 2 presents results controlling for mandatory minimum length.
Column 3 presents results excluding sentences with statutory mandatory minimums. Column 4 presents
results controlling for Chapter 2 adjusted offense level, which is only available for years 1999-2009. Column
5 presents results controlling for armed career criminal and career offender classification. All regressions
contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination.
Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors
are clustered at the district level. Race trends are excluded. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant
at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table A3. Sentence Length in Months - Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence
Placebo Case 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Placebo*Black -2.545** -2.924*** -2.429** -1.743** -1.907*** -0.961 -0.959 0.0188 0.672 0.867
(1.080) (0.921) (0.928) (0.787) (0.709) (0.642) (0.649) (0.804) (0.780) (0.739)
Placebo*Hispanic -2.373** -1.758* -0.845 -0.355 -0.838 -0.461 -0.653 -0.316 -0.415 0.688
(0.975) (0.941) (0.738) (0.705) (0.602) (0.602) (0.675) (0.691) (0.658) (0.559)
Placebo*Other -0.854 -1.739 -0.504 0.470 0.549 1.735 0.929 -0.00518 -0.878 0.261
(2.510) (1.919) (1.899) (1.969) (1.623) (1.196) (1.826) (1.974) (1.876) (1.464)
Race Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 692,039 692,039 692,039 692,039 692,039 692,039 692,039 692,039 692,039 692,039
R-squared 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. Coefficients are from DD regressions of placebo case decisions on racial disparities in sentencing, identical
to specification (4) in Table II. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination.
Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. Race trends
are included. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table A4. Sentence Lengths by Major Offense Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Drugs Immigration Firearms Fraud Bank Larceny Forgery
Robbery
Booker*Black 2.354*** 0.0632 0.475 1.487*** -2.248 0.379 0.278
(0.804) (0.473) (0.853) (0.408) (1.919) (0.791) (0.532)
Booker*Hispanic 1.275* 0.643 1.167 1.996*** -7.224** -0.0837 -0.331
(0.674) (0.503) (1.434) (0.603) (3.042) (1.258) (0.561)
Booker*Other 0.177 -0.112 4.832* 0.703 -3.872 1.627* 1.623
(1.415) (1.007) (2.552) (1.018) (3.737) (0.903) (1.885)
Black 4.265*** -0.00646 1.791*** 0.203 0.908 -0.250 -0.461
(0.647) (0.468) (0.613) (0.172) (0.968) (0.230) (0.332)
Hispanic 3.594*** -0.173 -0.926 -0.672*** 2.745 -0.474 -0.471
(0.454) (0.484) (0.912) (0.224) (2.477) (0.450) (0.317)
Other 1.686 1.047 0.319 -0.137 -1.195 -0.167 0.183
(1.447) (1.116) (2.175) (0.337) (2.698) (0.445) (0.647)
Booker -3.927** -0.859* -2.090 -2.721** -9.703* 0.781 0.859
(1.716) (0.506) (2.520) (1.159) (5.604) (1.380) (2.751)
Observations 299,687 123,882 69,241 59,130 21,704 12,222 9,546
R-squared 0.752 0.812 0.720 0.749 0.687 0.795 0.785
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. Column 1 includes controls for primary drug type. All regressions
contain dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by sen-
tencing year, and sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. Race specific
trends are excluded because of limited variation, but magnitudes are unchanged when race trends are included. *** =
significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table A5. Other Sentencing Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incarceration Probation Supervised Release Supervised
Length Receipt Release
Booker*Black 0.00525 -0.146 0.00154 -1.522***
(0.00392) (0.635) (0.00132) (0.316)
Booker*Hispanic 0.00806* 2.119* -0.00129 -1.433***
(0.00437) (1.109) (0.00283) (0.322)
Booker*Other 0.00260 -1.894* -0.00723* -2.529***
(0.00870) (0.998) (0.00376) (0.553)
Black 0.0172*** -0.269 -0.00249** 1.771***
(0.00319) (0.512) (0.00123) (0.224)
Hispanic 0.00776* -5.952*** -0.000426 0.124
(0.00447) (0.863) (0.00248) (0.246)
Other -0.00533 1.265 0.0145** 1.085**
(0.00865) (0.963) (0.00650) (0.441)
Booker -0.0212*** -2.400*** 0.00861* 0.932*
(0.00733) (0.855) (0.00499) (0.501)
Race Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 817,222 137,499 678,699 666,846
R-squared 0.468 0.356 0.139 0.454
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense
type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also
contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors are
clustered at the district level. Race trends are included. *** = significant at 1 percent level, **
= significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table A6. Acceptance of Responsibility Reduction
(1) (2) (3)
2 Point Reduction 3 Point Reduction Any Reduction
Booker*Black 0.00556 -0.00299 -0.00445
(0.00550) (0.00475) (0.00368)
Booker*Hispanic 0.00433 0.000752 -0.00140
(0.00553) (0.00433) (0.00391)
Booker*Other 0.0200** 0.0178 0.0130*
(0.00908) (0.0111) (0.00658)
Black -0.0114*** -0.0314*** -0.0177***
(0.00397) (0.00349) (0.00270)
Hispanic 0.0174*** -0.00817* 0.00215
(0.00453) (0.00459) (0.00416)
Other -0.0206*** -0.000458 -0.00305
(0.00650) (0.0104) (0.00757)
Booker 0.000354 -0.00246 -0.000984
(0.0111) (0.00775) (0.00616)
Race Trends? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 326,524 569,481 822,002
R-squared 0.596 0.399 0.272
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense
type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions
also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month fixed effects, and standard
errors are clustered at the district level. Race trends are included. *** = significant at 1
percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table A7. Dynamic Specification, Black White Gap
(1) (2) (3)
Black White Gap Black White Gap Black White Gap
Sentence Above Range Below Range
55-60 Months Before 1.240 -0.000592 -0.00776
(0.908) (0.00497) (0.0111)
49-54 Months Before -0.0703 -0.00332 -0.00183
(1.071) (0.00549) (0.0103)
43-48 Months Before -0.393 -0.0109** -0.00248
(0.867) (0.00508) (0.00967)
37-42 Months Before 0.227 -0.00367 -0.0115
(0.847) (0.00519) (0.00797)
31-36 Months Before 1.225 -0.00616 -0.00888
(1.107) (0.00469) (0.00978)
25-30 Months Before -0.283 -0.00755 0.00738
(0.760) (0.00515) (0.0115)
19-24 Months Before 1.245 -0.00599 -0.00305
(0.814) (0.00468) (0.0101))
13-18 Months Before 0.898 -0.0103** -0.00122
(0.850) (0.00415) (0.00928)
7-12 Months Before 0.897 -0.00564 0.00753
(0.791) (0.00451) (0.0105)
1-6 Months Before 0.690 -0.00257 0.0103
(1.119) (0.00568) (0.00923)
1-6 Months After 1.060 -0.00973* -0.00192
(0.988) (0.00579) (0.0122)
7-12 Months After 1.530 -0.00363 0.00142
(1.287) (0.00713) (0.0114)
13-18 Months After 1.729 -0.00556 -6.17e-05
(1.101) (0.00535) (0.0105)
19-24 Months After 1.566 -0.000684 -0.0161
(1.279) (0.00636) (0.0115)
25-30 Months After 2.526** 0.00963 -0.00910
(1.057) (0.00608) (0.0109)
31-36 Months After 3.274*** 0.0140** -0.0204*
(1.229) (0.00596) (0.0104)
37-42 Months After 3.645*** 0.0207*** -0.0333***
(1.026) (0.00499) (0.0123)
43-48 Months After 4.408*** 0.0288*** -0.0516***
(1.106) (0.00639) (0.0112)
49-54 Months After 4.323*** 0.0259*** -0.0375***
(1.152) (0.00702) (0.0124)
55-58 Months After 2.887* 0.0348*** -0.0223
(1.578) (0.00913) (0.0147)
Observations 692,039 692,039 692,039
R-squared 0.741 0.169 0.193
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. Coefficients are for the differential out-
come for black vs. white defendants from a dynamic DD regression identical to specifi-
cation (1) in Table II, but with leads and lags for the five years before and five years after
Booker, interacted with defendant race. All regressions contain controls for offense type,
and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also
contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors
are clustered at the district level. Race trends are excluded. *** = significant at 1 percent
level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table A8. Defendant Demographic Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male Age Number Non US Less than
Dependents Citizen HS
Booker*Black 0.0234*** -0.715*** 0.0375 -0.0209*** -0.00324
(0.00698) (0.139) (0.0246) (0.00734) (0.00553)
Booker*Hispanic 0.00756 -0.113 0.0335 0.00909 0.00125
(0.00531) (0.156) (0.0312) (0.00980) (0.00709)
Booker*Other 0.00976 -0.568 -0.0553 0.0205* 0.0247**
(0.0110) (0.342) (0.0517) (0.0108) (0.0117)
Black -0.0258** -4.455*** 0.595*** 0.0274** 0.0743***
(0.0100) (0.166) (0.0287) (0.0120) (0.00768)
Hispanic 0.00317 -4.086*** 0.463*** 0.408*** 0.213***
(0.00665) (0.194) (0.0301) (0.0183) (0.0116)
Other -0.0354*** -3.227*** 0.267*** 0.162*** 0.0319*
(0.00803) (0.271) (0.0521) (0.0314) (0.0178)
Booker -0.00310 0.400 -0.0674 -0.00134 -0.0138
(0.00822) (0.278) (0.0473) (0.00978) (0.0128)
Race Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 824,680 824,680 824,680 824,680 824,680
R-squared 0.135 0.182 0.125 0.568 0.240
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense type,
and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain
district by sentencing year, and sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at
the district level. Race trends are included. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5
percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table A9. Defendant Criminal Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crim Total Crim Crim History Base Ch. 2 Final
History Points Category Offense Offense Offense
Booker*Black 0.00347 0.104 0.0330 -0.201** -0.356*** -0.413***
(0.00623) (0.0984) (0.0261) (0.0896) (0.135) (0.112)
Booker*Hispanic -0.00669 0.0438 -0.220 -0.0295 -0.0805 -0.835***
(0.00769) (0.252) (0.0352) (0.158) (0.186) (0.148)
Booker*Other 0.0277** 0.115 0.0208 0.203 0.431 0.228
(0.0133) (0.156) (0.0517) (0.236) (0.298) (0.246)
Black 0.0800*** 1.717*** 0.607*** 0.968*** 0.604*** 0.858***
(0.00583) (0.104) (0.0269) (0.120) (0.147) (0.153)
Hispanic -0.0236*** -0.445** -0.0753** -0.220 0.451 0.703***
(0.00787) (0.177) (0.0309) (0.158) (0.278) (0.261)
Other -0.0671*** -0.980*** -0.273*** 0.203 -0.330 -0.0818
(0.0146) (0.150) (0.0535) (0.236) (0.264) (0.231)
Booker -0.00223 -0.224 -0.0398 0.689*** 0.756*** 1.239***
(0.0127) (0.185) (0.0366) (0.167) (0.196) (0.203)
Observations 636,698 822,908 824,680 822,678 553,759 824,680
R-squared 0.224 0.206 0.307 (0.442) 0.541 0.522
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. When the dependent variable is the Chapter 2 adjusted offense
level, data is from 1999-2009. Regressions for criminal history, total criminal history points and criminal history
category contain controls for final offense level. Regressions for Chapter 2 and final offense level control for
criminal history category. All regressions contain controls for offense type. Regressions also contain district by
sentencing year, and sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. Race
trends are included. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10
percent level.
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Table A10. Sentencing Departures from the Guidelines
Base Offense Level Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sentence Above Months Below Months Within Months
Range Above Range Below Range Within
Booker*Black 1.895** 0.0196*** 0.142 -0.0174** -23.61* -0.00230 0.711
(0.778) (0.00379) (3.294) (0.00729) (13.64) (0.00609) (0.720)
Booker*Hispanic 0.188 0.0105*** 3.857 0.00465 -5.967 -0.0152 -1.397**
(0.595) (0.00381) (3.181) (0.0101) (16.25) (0.00921) (0.600)
Booker*Other 0.717 0.0104 3.893 0.00711 5.696 -0.0175 -0.378
(1.211) (0.00665) (7.433) (0.0148) (27.49) (0.0152) (1.061)
Black 2.894*** 0.00247 2.825 -0.0522*** 8.118 0.0497*** -0.981
(0.680) (0.00326) (2.634) (0.00776) (10.21) (0.00781) (0.620)
Hispanic -0.491 -0.00790*** -4.412* -0.0667*** -3.500 0.0746*** -2.150***
(0.617) (0.00273) (2.339) (0.00804) (8.147) (0.00866) (0.658)
Other 3.994*** 0.00882* 2.874 -0.0543** -15.11 0.0455* 2.986***
(1.213) (0.00463) (5.349) (0.0240) (15.84) (0.0241) (1.018)
Booker 0.271 0.00214 4.891 0.0981*** 34.63*** -0.100*** 2.180**
(1.259) (0.00731) (4.087) (0.0135) (13.06) (0.0142) (1.085)
Race Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 677,711 677,711 41,379 677,711 255,167 677,711 381,138
R-squared 0.580 0.174 0.215 0.162 0.118 0.136 0.768
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for
each base offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and
sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** = significant at 1 percent
level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table A11. Sentence Length in Months
Linked Arrest Through Sentencing
(1) (2)
Sentence Sentence
Booker*Black 1.796** 2.258**
(0.732) (1.089)
Black 2.038*** 3.868***
(0.556) (0.952)
Booker -2.361** 3.359**
(1.131) (1.603)
Non US Citizen 1.718*** 1.096
(0.457) (0.678)
HS Grad -0.589*** 0.429
(0.202) (0.291)
Some College -1.646*** -0.272
(0.214) (0.412)
College Grad -2.282*** 2.105***
(0.241) (0.641)
# Dependents -0.158*** 0.564***
(0.0470) (0.0965)
Female -5.295*** -10.94***
(0.514) (0.878)
Age 0.144*** 0.452***
(0.0368) (0.0583)
Age2 -0.00165*** -0.00325***
(0.000437) (0.000676)
Race Trends? Yes Yes
Observations 340,755 342,056
R-squared 0.749 0.469
Notes: Data is from the linked arrest through sentenc-
ing dataset from 1994-2009. Column 1 replicates the
main results in Table II. Column 2 controls for arrest
offense, rather than final offense level. Regressions
also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing
month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered
at the district level. Race trends are included. *** =
significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 per-
cent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table A12. Selection into Sentencing Stage
(1) (2) (3)
Guilty Plea Dropped Charge Deferred Prosecution
Booker*Black -0.0115 -0.00451* 0.000103
(0.00808) (0.00242) (0.000901)
Black -0.00718 0.00634*** -0.000823
(0.00948) (0.00218) (0.000854)
Booker -0.112*** -0.00186 -5.74e-05
(0.00779) (0.00351) (0.000385)
Observations 1,669,560 1,669,560 1,669,560
R-squared 0.241 0.043 0.032
Notes: Data is from the Arrests and Bookings for Federal Offenses from 1994-
2009. All regressions contain controls for defendant gender, age, marital status,
citizenship status, primary offense type, district court by arrest year fixed effects,
and race trends. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The coefficient
of interest is the interaction of defendant race (omitted group white defendants)
with a Booker indicator for defendants arrested after Booker. Race trends are
included. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, *
= significant at 10 percent level.
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Table A13. Randomization Tests 2000-2009
District Court No. Obs. p-value
ME (0) 1,668 0.1438
MA (1) 4,042 0.1054
NH (2) 1,617 0.9844
PR (4) 6520 0.2674
CT** (5) 664 0.0000
NY North - Syracuse (6) 1,148 0.1074
NY East** (7) 12,447 0.0004
NY South - White Plains (8) 1,338 0.4336
NY West - Rochester (9) 1,166 0.6226
VT (10) 1,400 0.2379
DE (11) 641 0.3831
NJ -Trenton (12) 476 0.2983
PA East** (13) 6,411 0.0000
PA Middle - Scranton (14) 969 0.6837
PA Middle - Williamsport (14) 234 0.2071
PA West - Erie (15) 609 0.0521
PA West - Pittsburgh (15) 2,917 0.0645
MD (16) 5,569 0.0631
NC East - Southern (17) 608 0.3847
NC Middle (18) 3,205 0.08086
NC West**(19) 5,563 0.0000
SC** (20) 8,848 0.0000
VA East -Alexandria (22) 4,500 0.3178
VA East -Norfolk (22) 1,105 0.1658
VA East -Newport News (22) 743 0.0662
VA West (23) 3,123 0.3250
WV North - Martinsburg (24) 639 0.4091
WV South (25) 1,778 0.0932
AL North** (26) 1,430 0.0189
AL Middle (27) 904 0.3242
AL South (28) 3,132 0.0702
FL North (29) 2,718 0.5783
FL Middle - Ft. Myers (30) 923 0.3824
FL Middle - Ocala (30) 465 0.3128
FL South - Ft. Pierce (31) 3,299 0.0541
FL South - Ft. Lauderdale (31) 649 0.2485
GA North** (32) 5,823 0.0000
GA Middle (33) 2,064 0.1396
LA East (35) 3,117 0.0606
LA West (36) 1,686 .6360
MS North (37) 925 0.4247
MS South (38) 3,057 0.0564
TX North - Forth Worth (39) 2,027 0.2386
TX East (40) 6,563 0.5598
TX South - Brownsville (41) 10,112 0.3364
TX South - Corpus Christi (41) 6,679 0.2767
TX South - Laredo (41) 19,079 0.6244
TX South - McAllen (41) 12,739 0.1093
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TX West - Del Rio (42) 7,098 0.3500
TX West - Midland-Odessa (42) 3,567 0.4120
KY East - Covington (43) 717 0.5872
KY East - Pikeville (43) 139 0.0966
KY East - Lexington (43) 1,993 0.8694
KY West (44) 1,746 0.1114
MI East - Bay City (45) 458 0.4009
MI East - Flint (45) 673 0.3014
MI West (46) 3,313 0.0961
OH North - Toledo (47) 1,014 0.2105
OH South - Dayton (48) 1,300 0.9115
TN East (49) 5,200 0.0705
TN Middle** (50) 1,938 0.0126
TN West - Eastern (51) 831 0.3998
IL North - Rockford (52) 624 0.8929
IL Central (53) 2,618 0.1283
IL South (54) 2,736 0.1296
IN North - South Bend (55) 954 0.2764
IN North - Fort Wayne (55) 530 0.0741
IN South (56) 2,004 0.3266
WI East - Milwaukee (57) 2,206 0.4223
WI West (58) 1,571 0.1123
AR East (60) 2,739 0.1631
AR West**(61) 1,098 0.0001
IA North (62) 2,413 0.0561
IA South (63) 2,684 0.8265
MN** (64) 4,815 0.0001
MO East (65) 8,203 0.0785
MO West (66) 6,764 0.1191
NE - Omaha (67) 2,323 0.0532
ND (68) 1,888 0.2250
SD - Aberdeen (69) 309 0.1479
SD - Pierre (69) 1,010 0.8757
AZ - Tuscon (70) 23,677 0.0961
AZ - Yuma (70) 2,449 0.3392
CA North (71) 3,045 0.1970
CA East (72) 8,094 0.0646
CA Central - Riverside (73) 157 0.4520
CA South - El Centro (74) 8,664 0.3442
CA South - Yuma (74) 89 0.3502
HI** (75) 3,351 0.0012
ID (76) 1,526 0.0544
MT - Missoula (77) 516 0.1698
MT - Great Falls (77) 1,003 0.2206
NV (78) 4,867 0.6549
OR - Eugene (79) 954 0.2261
OR - Medford (79) 434 0.6618
WA East - Spokane (80) 1,401 0.3100
WA West** (81) 5,302 0.0001
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CO** (82) 4,582 0.0000
KS (83) 5,509 0.2031
NM (84) 24,019 0.2924
OK North (85) 1,279 0.3240
OK East (86) 736 0.9312
OK West** (87) 1,809 0.0001
UT (88) 5,276 0.9421
WY** (89) 1,565 0.0002
DC (90) 346 0.5720
AK (95) 1,218 0.1105
LA Middle** (96) 1,112 0.0263
Notes: Data is from the matched USSC, TRAC, Federal Ju-
dicial Center data from 2000-2009. I drop judges who retired
or were terminated prior to 2000, and judges and district of-
fices with an annual caseload of less than 25. For each district
court, I control for district office by sentencing year, sentencing
month, and judge fixed effects. P-values reported test whether
judge fixed effects differ significantly from zero and are from a
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) on five defendant char-
acteristics: defendant gender, age, black race indicator, number
of dependents, and less than high school indicator. ** indicates
dropped courthouses.
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Table A14. Main Results using Judge Matched Data
(1) (2)
Random Sample Full Matched Sample
Sentence Sentence
Booker*Black 1.994*** 2.486***
(0.691) (0.546)
Booker*Hispanic 0.732 1.076**
(0.563) (0.460)
Booker*Other 0.170 1.535
(0.880) (1.035)
Black 2.924*** 2.315***
(0.584) (0.404)
Hispanic 2.155*** 1.270***
(0.598) (0.467)
Other 3.070*** 1.932*
(0.713) (1.040)
Booker -2.897*** -2.811***
(1.073) (1.045)
Non US Citizen 0.433 1.283**
(0.496) (0.502)
HS Grad -0.701*** -0.555***
(0.215) (0.186)
Some College -1.434*** -1.762***
(0.310) (0.185)
College Grad -2.119*** -2.068***
(0.378) (0.247)
# Dependents -0.250*** -0.236***
(0.0713) (0.0477)
Female -4.996*** -5.035***
(0.515) (0.508)
Age 0.241*** 0.190***
(0.0606) (0.0446)
Age2 -0.00263*** -0.00208***
(0.000704) (0.000503)
Mandatory Min 22.13*** 21.41***
(2.086) (1.841)
Observations 214,136 478,834
R-squared 0.784 0.754
Notes: Data is from the matched USSC, TRAC, Federal Judicial Center
data from 2000-2009. Column 1 replicates column 1 from Table II using
the sample of random courts. Column 2 replicates column 1 of Table
II using the full matched sample. All regressions contain controls for
offense type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal history
combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and
sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the
district level. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5
percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table A15. Sentencing Patterns for Post Booker Judges
Full Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sentence Above Months Below Months Within Months
Range Above Range Below Range Within
Post Booker Judge 0.694 -0.00483 -3.645 -0.0295* -2.806 0.0343** -0.0298
(1.097) (0.00601) (4.444) (0.0164) (4.064) (0.0162) (0.258)
Post Booker Judge*Black 4.197** 0.0234* 2.973 -0.0109 -4.228 -0.0125 1.004**
(1.776) (0.0135) (4.455) (0.0167) (6.711) (0.0196) (0.442)
Post Booker Judge*Hispanic -0.147 0.0119 -2.594 0.0138 -1.786 -0.0257 0.305
(1.059) (0.0133) (4.246) (0.0226) (4.525) (0.0241) (0.290)
Post Booker Judge*Other -4.157** -0.00702 -9.901 0.0919*** -7.199 -0.0849** 0.627
(1.628) (0.0139) (6.364) (0.0318) (4.882) (0.0343) (0.845)
Booker -2.763** 0.00897 -1.482 0.101*** 0.770 -0.110*** -0.179
(1.051) (0.00697) (6.409) (0.0149) (4.228) (0.0147) (0.276)
Booker*Black 2.296*** 0.0141*** 4.203* -0.0170** 8.955** 0.00296 0.534***
(0.542) (0.00294) (2.278) (0.00647) (3.707) (0.00566) (0.187)
Booker*Hispanic 1.071** 0.000226 2.678 -0.00414 3.231 0.00391 0.328***
(0.454) (0.00383) (2.181) (0.00935) (2.743) (0.00834) (0.0911)
Booker*Other 1.717 0.00394 0.351 -0.00673 17.03* 0.00279 -0.000959
(1.035) (0.00461) (5.212) (0.0108) (10.24) (0.0106) (0.233)
Observations 478,834 478,834 27,743 478,834 184,986 478,834 266,102
R-squared 0.754 0.169 0.274 0.204 0.842 0.172 0.983
Notes: Data is from the matched USSC, TRAC, Federal Judicial Center data from 2000-2009. All regressions contain controls
for offense type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by
sentencing year, and sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** = significant at 1
percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table A16. Sentencing Patterns for Post Booker Judges
Subsample of Random Districts - Excluding Binding Statutory Minimums
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sentence Above Months Below Months Within Months
Range Above Range Below Range Within
Post Booker Judge 0.233 0.00576 10.78 -0.0113 0.896 0.00552 -0.631*
(1.162) (0.00656) (9.189) (0.0176) (1.175) (0.0165) (0.347)
Post Booker Judge*Black 3.913* -0.00640 -8.753 -0.00562 -2.876 0.0120 1.476***
(2.352) (0.0108) (8.408) (0.0279) (1.768) (0.0238) (0.508)
Post Booker Judge*Hispanic -0.420 -0.00371 -3.300 0.0122 -0.382 -0.00846 0.614
(1.151) (0.00940) (8.174) (0.0310) (1.902) (0.0258) (0.393)
Post Booker Judge*Other 1.282 0.0404 4.062 0.0284 1.850 -0.0687 2.905
(2.711) (0.0280) (16.72) (0.0601) (3.017) (0.0605) (2.474)
Booker -1.978** 0.0120 9.434 0.0752*** -1.398 -0.0872*** -0.345
(0.954) (0.00854) (11.63) (0.0226) (1.426) (0.0233) (0.426)
Booker*Black 0.395 0.00172 -0.933 -0.00321 -1.406* 0.00150 0.382*
(0.632) (0.00340) (5.335) (0.00790) (0.737) (0.00805) (0.215)
Booker*Hispanic 1.097** 0.00648* 3.788 -0.0131 0.00754 0.00667 0.351**
(0.534) (0.00329) (4.559) (0.0182) (0.579) (0.0171) (0.146)
Booker*Other -0.371 0.000431 2.917 -0.0109 0.406 0.0104 -0.524
(0.887) (0.00881) (7.044) (0.0246) (1.101) (0.0221) (0.398)
Observations 174,434 174,434 4,330 174,434 69,632 174,434 100,268
R-squared 0.840 0.064 0.608 0.255 0.752 0.231 0.987
Notes: Data is from the matched USSC, TRAC, Federal Judicial Center data from 2000-2009 for courts with random assign-
ment, excluding judges who formally retired prior to 2000. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for
each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district office by sentencing year, district court
fixed effects, sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** = significant at 1 percent
level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table A17. Sentencing for Post Booker Judges - Comparison to Pre Booker Bush Appointees
Subsample of Random Districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sentence Above Months Below Months Within Months
Range Above Range Above Range Within
Post Booker Judge -1.002 -0.00562 -0.424 -0.00969 -1.785 0.0153 -0.741**
(1.702) (0.0115) (7.811) (0.0163) (6.092) (0.0148) (0.297)
Post Booker Judge*Black 5.694** 0.0198 6.018 -0.0140 0.886 -0.00584 1.245**
(2.621) (0.0150) (6.666) (0.0246) (8.282) (0.0194) (0.496)
Post Booker Judge*Hispanic -0.712 0.0147 -7.757 0.0136 -3.067 -0.0283 0.812**
(1.568) (0.0230) (7.942) (0.0282) (5.560) (0.0309) (0.371)
Post Booker Judge*Other 0.503 0.0389 -11.31 0.0307 0.122 -0.0696 2.684
(2.743) (0.0311) (13.03) (0.0633) (6.237) (0.0595) (2.311)
Booker -2.513** -0.00116 0.534 0.0815*** -1.134 -0.0803*** -0.259
(1.087) (0.0106) (5.492) (0.0193) (3.183) (0.0203) (0.383)
Booker*Black 1.658** 0.0151*** 6.558* -0.0102 6.725 -0.00491 0.649***
(0.797) (0.00518) (3.860) (0.00798) (7.028) (0.00757) (0.197)
Booker*Hispanic 0.766 0.000747 -0.0243 -0.0118 3.987 0.0111 0.378***
(0.551) (0.00454) (3.160) (0.0147) (3.042) (0.0136) (0.131)
Booker*Other -0.231 0.00186 5.001 -0.00783 1.725 0.00597 -0.272
(0.963) (0.00911) (6.341) (0.0202) (4.334) (0.0186) (0.415)
Pre Booker Bush 1.219 0.00324 -10.94* -0.0446** -4.095 0.0414* 0.154
(1.161) (0.00614) (6.186) (0.0198) (2.861) (0.0219) (0.242)
Pre Booker Bush*Black 2.315 0.00512 9.985 -0.00139 6.167 -0.00373 0.318
(1.712) (0.00988) (8.224) (0.0176) (8.236) (0.0192) (0.263)
Pre Booker Bush*Hispanic 0.0911 0.00169 4.016 0.0361 2.602 -0.0378 -0.0322
(1.398) (0.00617) (6.225) (0.0238) (2.934) (0.0244) (0.215)
Pre Booker Bush*Other -0.567 -0.0100 6.193 0.0121 3.751 -0.00207 0.481
(2.259) (0.0104) (18.15) (0.0353) (5.223) (0.0361) (0.386)
Booker*Pre Booker Bush -0.725 -0.00357 9.820 0.0210 5.753 -0.0174 -0.109
(1.241) (0.00741) (7.513) (0.0189) (3.550) (0.0228) (0.318)
Booker*Pre Booker Bush*Black -1.375 -0.00575 -10.94 -0.0141 -6.872 0.0198 -0.305
(1.758) (0.0124) (10.18) (0.0193) (9.353) (0.0214) (0.453)
Booker*Pre Booker Bush*Hispanic -0.124 -0.00171 -5.195 -0.0226 -4.572 0.0244 -0.0529
(1.433) (0.00765) (6.764) (0.0200) (3.590) (0.0228) (0.297)
Booker*Pre Booker Bush*Other 1.375 0.0108 -0.555 -0.0206 -2.776 0.00984 -1.020
(1.626) (0.0135) (23.78) (0.0386) (7.305) (0.0423) (0.646)
Observations 214,136 214,136 13,091 214,136 82,432 214,136 118,612
R-squared 0.784 0.194 0.368 0.244 0.919 0.202 0.985
Notes: Data is from the matched USSC, TRAC, Federal Judicial Center data from 2000-2009 for courts with random assignment,
excluding judges who formally retired prior to 2000. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each offense
level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month fixed effects, and
standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at
10 percent level.
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Table A18. Sentencing for Post Booker Judges
Comparison to New Judges Pre Booker
(1)
Sentence
Post Booker Judge 0.970
(1.837)
Post Booker Judge*Black 4.937**
(2.508)
Post Booker Judge*Hispanic -1.682
(1.539)
Post Booker Judge*Other -0.263
(2.708)
Booker -3.155***
(1.070)
Booker*Black 1.770**
(0.847)
Booker*Hispanic 0.876
(0.543)
Booker*Other -0.0169
(1.051)
New Judge 1.568
(1.330)
New Judge*Black 1.753
(1.599)
New Judge*Hispanic -1.062
(1.480)
New Judge*Other -0.483
(2.037)
Booker*New Judge -0.983
(1.199)
Booker*New Judge*Black -0.950
(1.562)
Booker*New Judge*Hispanic 0.605
(1.324)
Booker*New Judge*Other 2.402
(1.849)
Observations 214,136
R-squared 0.780
Notes: Data is from the matched USSC, TRAC, Federal Judi-
cial Center data from 2000-2009 for courts with random assign-
ment, excluding judges who formally retired prior to 2000. All
regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for
each offense level and criminal history combination. Regres-
sions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing
month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the dis-
trict level. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant
at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table A19. Sentencing Patterns Before and After Booker, By Judicial Demographics
Subsample of Random Districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sentence Above Months Below Months Within Months
Range Above Range Above Range Within
Post Booker Judge -1.441 -0.00562 -0.498 0.0136 -2.160 -0.00794 -0.754**
(1.759) (0.0114) (8.488) (0.0174) (5.945) (0.0148) (0.319)
Post Booker Judge*Black 4.382* 0.0202 4.746 -0.00394 1.433 -0.0162 0.983*
(2.530) (0.0144) (7.207) (0.0236) (8.284) (0.0198) (0.538)
Post Booker Judge*Hispanic -0.677 0.0157 -6.538 0.000139 -2.496 -0.0159 0.822**
(1.618) (0.0227) (8.008) (0.0306) (5.541) (0.0331) (0.366)
Post Booker Judge*Other 0.561 0.0451 -12.61 0.0253 -1.288 -0.0704 2.613
(2.654) (0.0310) (12.44) (0.0646) (6.763) (0.0615) (2.328)
Booker -2.555** -0.000691 1.446 0.0719*** 0.736 -0.0712*** -0.401
(1.254) (0.0118) (6.244) (0.0224) (4.371) (0.0231) (0.397)
Booker*Black 3.050*** 0.0117** 15.03** -0.0134 -3.143 0.00170 0.823**
(1.147) (0.00556) (6.023) (0.0109) (8.627) (0.0101) (0.389)
Booker*Hispanic 0.760 -0.00167 -0.227 -0.00486 2.081 0.00653 0.358*
(0.831) (0.00569) (4.147) (0.0173) (4.288) (0.0156) (0.204)
Booker*Other 0.0750 0.00327 8.481 -0.00508 0.0415 0.00182 -0.954
(1.103) (0.0116) (12.74) (0.0286) (5.458) (0.0245) (0.610)
Female Judge 1.418 0.00285 -3.574 -0.0110 3.612 0.00814 0.328
(1.027) (0.00642) (6.059) (0.0135) (4.705) (0.0161) (0.292)
Female Judge*Black 0.230 0.00242 7.303 0.0145 0.445 -0.0169 -0.176
(1.602) (0.00911) (6.260) (0.0180) (12.81) (0.0201) (0.368)
Female Judge*Hispanic -0.996 0.00206 3.262 0.000581 2.271 -0.00264 -0.333
(1.214) (0.00811) (6.608) (0.0190) (5.069) (0.0211) (0.245)
Female Judge*Other -2.031 -0.0124 2.331 0.00735 -10.92 0.00501 -0.875
(1.329) (0.00963) (9.701) (0.0264) (7.838) (0.0276) (0.566)
Female Judge*Booker -2.417** -0.00351 2.032 0.0208 3.671 -0.0173 -0.226
(0.951) (0.00879) (6.990) (0.0142) (4.586) (0.0181) (0.380)
Female Judge*Booker*Black -0.0853 -0.00367 -10.97 -0.0221 -7.574 0.0257 -0.333
(1.643) (0.0121) (7.743) (0.0214) (12.88) (0.0256) (0.452)
Female Judge*Booker*Hispanic 1.530 -0.000806 0.134 -0.00556 -9.481* 0.00637 0.372
(0.982) (0.0105) (7.266) (0.0161) (5.520) (0.0202) (0.349)
Female Judge*Booker*Other 1.599 0.0127 8.924 -0.0137 7.373 0.00104 0.325
(2.263) (0.0176) (15.01) (0.0316) (9.548) (0.0304) (0.734)
Black Judge -0.331 -0.00651 -5.803 -0.0142 -9.873 0.0207 0.0118
(0.793) (0.00758) (4.309) (0.0127) (11.31) (0.0158) (0.217)
Black Judge*Black 1.445 0.00771 13.53** 0.00716 -11.16 -0.0149 0.245
(1.322) (0.00815) (5.807) (0.0137) (21.36) (0.0164) (0.327)
Black Judge*Hispanic -0.405 -0.00252 1.355 0.0378 16.00 -0.0353 0.0286
(1.013) (0.00967) (5.835) (0.0241) (11.44) (0.0275) (0.296)
Black Judge*Other 1.587 -0.00655 23.21* -0.0576** 2.950 0.0641* -0.0150
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(1.783) (0.0147) (11.89) (0.0269) (12.03) (0.0335) (0.594)
Black Judge*Booker -0.615 0.00244 6.650 0.0269 10.27 -0.0294 -0.0790
(1.278) (0.0103) (4.678) (0.0168) (10.52) (0.0208) (0.317)
Black Judge*Booker*Black -1.916 -0.00161 -15.77** -0.00492 11.38 0.00653 -0.361
(1.669) (0.00974) (6.071) (0.0205) (21.02) (0.0226) (0.503)
Black Judge*Booker*Hispanic -0.543 0.00172 -4.824 -0.0388 -16.28 0.0371 -0.224
(1.256) (0.0112) (6.605) (0.0266) (10.63) (0.0284) (0.414)
Black Judge*Booker*Other -1.470 0.0198 -21.87* 0.107*** -8.142 -0.127*** 0.433
(1.890) (0.0188) (13.01) (0.0345) (12.33) (0.0401) (0.746)
Democratic Judge -0.969 0.00433 -0.903 0.0210* 4.061 -0.0254** -0.418*
(0.820) (0.00488) (4.072) (0.0109) (5.135) (0.0112) (0.218)
Democratic Judge*Black -0.658 -0.00890 6.518 0.0101 -6.783 -0.00123 -0.382
(1.055) (0.00559) (5.918) (0.00992) (9.201) (0.0111) (0.296)
Democratic Judge*Hispanic 0.526 -0.00411 1.370 -0.00607 -7.242 0.0102 0.218
(1.007) (0.00555) (4.969) (0.0125) (5.873) (0.0114) (0.184)
Democratic Judge*Other 0.632 0.00936 3.612 0.0129 -0.615 -0.0223 -0.799*
(1.218) (0.00895) (8.762) (0.0246) (6.925) (0.0239) (0.404)
Democratic Judge*Booker 0.176 -0.00773 0.180 0.0142 -3.031 -0.00642 0.447*
(1.101) (0.00694) (4.848) (0.0134) (5.629) (0.0146) (0.246)
Democratic Judge*Booker*Black -1.723 0.00920 -10.39 0.00429 8.125 -0.0135 -0.154
(1.410) (0.00748) (6.716) (0.0150) (8.599) (0.0157) (0.411)
Democratic Judge*Booker*Hispanic -0.421 0.00878 -0.857 -0.00946 6.917 0.000684 -0.261
(1.142) (0.00741) (5.687) (0.0140) (6.440) (0.0141) (0.239)
Democratic Judge*Booker*Other -0.647 0.000605 -2.612 -0.0285 0.319 0.0279 0.194
(1.785) (0.0113) (13.02) (0.0327) (10.31) (0.0338) (0.647)
Pre Guidelines Judge -0.546 -0.00326 -4.842 0.00841 3.989 -0.00515 0.206
(0.761) (0.00499) (4.541) (0.0125) (9.640) (0.0127) (0.203)
Pre Guidelines Judge*Black 1.575 -0.00139 12.08 -0.00217 -26.72 0.00356 0.0770
(1.260) (0.00632) (7.558) (0.0113) (20.37) (0.0124) (0.351)
Pre Guidelines Judge*Hispanic 0.138 0.00254 3.825 -0.0147 -5.434 0.0121 -0.210
(0.791) (0.00490) (5.218) (0.0166) (9.774) (0.0170) (0.191)
Pre Guidelines Judge*Other 0.421 0.0256* 4.107 -0.0133 -8.988 -0.0123 -1.301**
(1.349) (0.0140) (9.500) (0.0251) (13.36) (0.0267) (0.531)
Pre Guidelines Judge*Booker 0.645 0.0132 2.289 0.00772 -1.550 -0.0209 -0.277
(1.197) (0.00931) (5.505) (0.0157) (9.094) (0.0146) (0.292)
Pre Guidelines Judge*Booker*Black -2.228 -0.00519 -10.61 0.00535 22.34 -0.000152 -0.300
(1.741) (0.0114) (8.665) (0.0184) (18.68) (0.0171) (0.489)
Pre Guidelines Judge*Booker*Hispanic -0.0513 -0.0108 3.226 -0.00771 2.848 0.0185 0.346
(1.100) (0.00869) (7.071) (0.0179) (9.145) (0.0161) (0.286)
Pre Guidelines Judge*Booker*Other 2.699 -0.0129 -14.23 -0.0461 5.441 0.0591 1.052
(2.648) (0.0236) (15.35) (0.0351) (13.52) (0.0369) (0.984)
Observations 214,136 214,136 13,091 214,136 82,432 214,136 118,612
R-squared 0.784 0.194 0.369 0.245 0.919 0.203 0.985
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Notes: Data is from the matched USSC, TRAC, Federal Judicial Center data from 2000-2009 for courts with random assignment, excluding
judges who formally retired prior to 2000. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal
history combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at
the district level. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table I. Summary Statistics
Panel A. USSC Data, 1994-2009
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Incarceration 853008 0.833 0.373 0 1
Probation Length in Months 142627 29.858 22.238 0 997
Sentence Length in Months 847227 49.290 65.108 0 985
Statutory Minimum Applied 853561 0.299 0.458 0 1
Settled by Trial 665073 0.044 0.205 0 1
Supervised Release in Months 852701 38.490 59.829 0 999
White 852875 0.318 0.466 0 1
Black 852875 0.261 0.439 0 1
Hispanic 852875 0.379 0.485 0 1
Non US Citizen 852990 0.320 0.467 0 1
Number of Dependents 854992 1.598 2.023 0 98
Less Than High School 842099 0.461 0.498 0 1
Male 854611 0.859 0.348 0 1
Age 854992 34.696 10.798 16 98
Criminal History Indicator 664422 0.746 0.435 0 1
Drug Trafficking Offense 854992 0.388 0.487 0 1
Immigration Offense 854992 0.179 0.383 0 1
Fraud Offense 854992 0.113 0.317 0 1
Firearm Offense 854992 0.092 0.289 0 1
Criminal History Category (1-6) 854992 2.361 1.699 1 6
Final Offense Level (1-43) 854992 18.841 8.961 1 43
Panel B. Judge Matched Data, 2000-2009
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Incarceration 643990 0.839 0.368 0 1
Probation Length in Months 103822 25.345 22.065 0 120
Sentence Length in Months 641986 45.920 59.871 0 985
Statutory Minimum Applied 633235 0.282 0.450 0 1
Settled by Trial 643990 0.035 0.183 0 1
Supervised Release in Months 643347 38.264 61.330 0 999
White 626500 0.294 0.456 0 1
Black 626500 0.234 0.423 0 1
Hispanic 626500 0.436 0.496 0 1
Non US Citizen 633942 0.384 0.486 0 1
Number of Dependents 595781 1.616 1.739 0 82
Less Than High School 599619 0.489 0.499 0 1
Male 636641 0.867 0.340 0 1
Age 638530 34.548 10.644 16 97
Criminal History Indicator 632772 0.749 0.434 0 1
Drug Trafficking Offense 643990 0.369 0.482 0 1
Immigration Offense 643990 0.251 0.433 0 1
Fraud Offense 643990 0.101 0.301 0 1
Firearm Offense 643990 0.096 0.295 0 1
Criminal History Category (1-6) 643990 2.416 1.705 1 6
Final Offense Level (1-43) 643990 18.451 8.625 1 43
Male Judge 643990 0.807 .395 0 1
White Judge 643990 0.767 .423 0 1
Black Judge 643990 0.083 .275 0 1
Hispanic Judge 643990 0.140 .347 0 1
Democratic Judge 643990 0.437 .496 0 1
Notes: Panel A is from the USSC data from 1994-2009. Panel B is from the USSC, TRAC,
and Federal Judicial Center matched data from 2000-2009.
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Table II. Sentence Length in Months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence
Booker*Black 2.373*** 1.653*** 1.343** 1.639** 1.642**
(0.595) (0.524) (0.617) (0.690) (0.689)
Booker*Hispanic 1.687*** 1.559*** 1.112** 1.098** 1.113**
(0.446) (0.547) (0.499) (0.539) (0.539)
Booker*Other 2.711*** 2.053** 2.295** -0.168 -0.105
(0.986) (1.021) (1.113) (1.235) (1.229)
Black 2.638*** 2.485*** 2.639*** 3.185*** 3.188***
(0.363) (0.411) (0.363) (0.591) (0.591)
Hispanic 0.878* 0.850* 0.877* 1.308** 1.306**
(0.461) (0.463) (0.461) (0.524) (0.522)
Other 1.061 0.903 1.057 3.177*** 3.142***
(1.092) (1.271) (1.092) (1.055) (1.050)
Booker -3.144*** -2.840*** -2.656*** -2.593** -3.671***
(1.010) (1.077) (0.995) (1.129) (1.323)
Non US Citizen 1.466*** 1.470*** 1.472*** 1.479*** 1.478***
(0.450) (0.452) (0.450) (0.452) (0.450)
HS Grad -0.554*** -0.554*** -0.555*** -0.554*** -0.546***
(0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185)
Some College -1.633*** -1.631*** -1.633*** -1.633*** -1.627***
(0.180) (0.181) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180)
College Grad -1.896*** -1.897*** -1.897*** -1.900*** -1.893***
(0.235) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235)
# Dependents -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.150***
(0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0441) (0.0439)
Female -5.388*** -5.387*** -5.385*** -5.386*** -5.385***
(0.502) (0.502) (0.501) (0.501) (0.501)
Age 0.149*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.147***
(0.0384) (0.0386) (0.0384) (0.0386) (0.0385)
Age2 -0.00147*** -0.00146*** -0.00146*** -0.00145*** -0.00145***
(0.000429) (0.000430) (0.000429) (0.000431) (0.000429)
Mandatory Min 23.15*** 23.15*** 23.14*** 23.15*** 23.15***
(1.752) (1.752) (1.751) (1.752) (1.752)
RGK -1.954***
(0.570)
RGK*Black 2.112***
(0.616)
RGK*Hispanic 1.198**
(0.502)
RGK*Other 0.871
(1.037)
Race*PROTECT? No Yes No No No
Race*RGK? No No Yes No No
Race Trends? No No No Yes Yes
Year*Month FE? No No No No Yes
Observations 679,159 679,159 679,159 679,159 679,159
R-squared 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dum-
mies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing
year, and sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** = signifi-
cant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table III. Sentencing Departures from the Guidelines
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sentence Above Months Below Months Within Months
Range Above Range Below Range Within
Booker*Black 1.639** 0.0186*** -0.395 -0.0161** -10.74 -0.00247 0.879***
(0.690) (0.00358) (3.255) (0.00743) (6.663) (0.00624) (0.212)
Booker*Hispanic 1.098** 0.00694* 4.562 0.0110 0.854 -0.0179* 0.260*
(0.539) (0.00414) (3.083) (0.0111) (4.852) (0.00949) (0.145)
Booker*Other -0.168 -0.00503 -0.274 0.0226 -3.812 -0.0176 -0.149
(1.235) (0.00592) (7.719) (0.0148) (9.318) (0.0153) (0.392)
Black 3.185*** 0.00132 1.981 -0.0541*** 4.134 0.0527*** -0.358***
(0.591) (0.00312) (2.508) (0.00709) (4.781) (0.00723) (0.116)
Hispanic 1.308** -0.00998*** -5.831** -0.0658*** -0.311 0.0757*** 0.0262
(0.524) (0.00270) (2.226) (0.00952) (3.917) (0.00947) (0.124)
Other 3.177*** 0.0151*** 4.535 -0.0667*** 1.999 0.0516** 0.291
(1.055) (0.00471) (5.593) (0.0242) (6.727) (0.0240) (0.232)
Booker -2.593** 0.00473 1.460 0.0892*** 13.58** -0.0940*** -0.230
(1.129) (0.00764) (4.447) (0.0141) (5.247) (0.0140) (0.280)
Race Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 679,159 679,159 41,478 679,159 255,776 679,159 381,901
R-squared 0.741 0.168 0.239 0.193 0.727 0.164 0.981
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies
for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and
sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** = significant at 1 percent
level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table IV. Disparities in Sentence Length by Other Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence
Booker*Black 2.373*** 2.024*** 1.680*** 1.326***
(0.595) (0.562) (0.537) (0.499)
Booker*Hispanic 1.687*** 1.561*** 1.226*** 0.975**
(0.446) (0.452) (0.427) (0.430)
Booker*Other 2.711*** 2.699*** 2.840*** 2.431**
(0.986) (0.987) (0.964) (1.067)
Booker*Non US Citizen -0.650* -0.189 -0.341
(0.334) (0.310) (0.362)
Booker*HS Grad -0.461* -0.413 -0.254
(0.272) (0.263) (0.261)
Booker*Some College -0.940*** -0.699** -0.303
(0.357) (0.331) (0.312)
Booker*College Grad -2.544*** -1.902*** -1.639***
(0.548) (0.491) (0.489)
Booker*# Dependents -0.0530 -0.0983 -0.133**
(0.0594) (0.0612) (0.0613)
Booker*Female -0.734** -0.125 0.159
(0.362) (0.323) (0.311)
Booker*Age -0.0151 -0.00991 -0.00792
(0.0113) (0.0105) (0.0110)
Booker*Criminal History 2 1.816*** 1.444***
(0.343) (0.369)
Booker*Criminal History 3 2.218*** 1.684***
(0.401) (0.431)
Booker*Criminal History 4 1.664*** 0.855*
(0.458) (0.470)
Booker*Criminal History 5 2.528*** 1.528***
(0.611) (0.581)
Booker*Criminal History 6 -0.447 -1.092
(0.751) (0.735)
Observations 679,159 679,159 679,159 679,159
R-squared 0.741 0.741 0.742 0.742
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain controls for of-
fense type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Column
1 replicates column 1 from Table II to show the baseline results. Column 2 includes inter-
actions between defendant race and citizenship status, educational attainment, number of
dependents, gender and age. Column 3 adds interactions between defendant race and final
offense level and criminal history category. Finally, column 4 adds interactions between
race and offense type. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing
month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. Race specific
trends are excluded because of limited variation, but magnitudes are unchanged when race
trends are included. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level,
* = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table V. Sentencing Patterns for Post Booker Judges
Subsample of Random Districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sentence Above Months Below Months Within Months
Range Above Range Below Range Within
Post Booker Judge -1.145 -0.00554 -0.194 -0.00260 0.987 0.00814 -0.759**
(1.727) (0.0113) (7.906) (0.0166) (1.355) (0.0142) (0.293)
Post Booker Judge*Black 5.440** 0.0200 6.293 -0.0101 -2.103 -0.00994 1.243**
(2.587) (0.0149) (6.918) (0.0246) (1.751) (0.0201) (0.501)
Post Booker Judge*Hispanic -0.625 0.0146 -7.618 0.00725 -0.797 -0.0219 0.838**
(1.574) (0.0228) (7.826) (0.0289) (1.826) (0.0311) (0.365)
Post Booker Judge*Other 0.218 0.0387 -12.89 0.0343 2.548 -0.0730 2.862
(2.625) (0.0306) (12.47) (0.0642) (2.407) (0.0607) (2.300)
Booker -2.835** -0.00253 3.104 0.0849*** -0.757 -0.0824*** -0.303
(1.074) (0.0108) (5.495) (0.0199) (1.137) (0.0211) (0.369)
Booker*Black 1.693** 0.0145*** 4.988 -0.0144* -1.061 -0.000126 0.616***
(0.696) (0.00443) (3.814) (0.00734) (0.689) (0.00715) (0.190)
Booker*Hispanic 0.744 0.000522 -0.830 -0.0123 0.0802 0.0118 0.357***
(0.547) (0.00420) (2.757) (0.0139) (0.466) (0.0129) (0.130)
Booker*Other 0.154 0.00403 5.574 -0.0118 0.415 0.00775 -0.545
(0.874) (0.00914) (6.971) (0.0223) (0.966) (0.0197) (0.358)
Observations 214,136 214,136 13,091 214,136 82,215 214,136 118,612
R-squared 0.784 0.194 0.367 0.244 0.736 0.202 0.985
Notes: Data is from the matched USSC, TRAC, Federal Judicial Center data from 2000-2009 for courts with random assign-
ment, excluding judges who formally retired prior to 2000. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for
each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district office by sentencing year, district court
fixed effects, sentencing month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** = significant at 1 percent
level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Table VI. Treatment of Mandatory Minimums
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mandatory Binding Safety Substantial
Minimum Minimum Valve Assistance
Booker*Black -0.00320 0.0240*** 0.0146 -0.0132
(0.00722) (0.00870) (0.00938) (0.0113)
Booker*Other -0.0174*** -0.00262 0.0207* -0.00440
(0.00569) (0.00703) (0.0116) (0.0122)
Booker*Hispanic -0.0231** -0.0162 0.0268 0.0507
(0.0112) (0.0192) (0.0322) (0.0308)
Black 0.0490*** 0.00678 -0.0193*** -0.0851***
(0.00745) (0.00673) (0.00601) (0.0107)
Hispanic 0.0477*** 0.0240*** 0.00275 -0.0858***
(0.00543) (0.00536) (0.00940) (0.0101)
Other -0.00959 0.00393 -0.0145 -0.0613**
(0.00800) (0.0130) (0.0192) (0.0292)
Booker 0.00158 -0.0349** -0.0119 0.0299
(0.00830) (0.0168) (0.0151) (0.0225)
Race Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 816,564 244,273 162,294 221,320
R-squared 0.649 0.638 0.668 0.171
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain con-
trols for offense type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal history
combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing
month fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** =
significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant
at 10 percent level. When the dependent variable is safety valve, data is from
1999-2009.
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Table VII. Sentencing Departures from the Guidelines
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sentence Above Months Below Months Within Months
Range Above Range Below Range Within
Booker*Black 1.183** 0.00850** 5.398 -0.00933 0.427 0.000834 0.138
(0.545) (0.00356) (3.360) (0.00842) (5.050) (0.00773) (0.118)
Booker*Hispanic 1.997*** 0.00478 4.171 -0.0367*** -7.968** 0.0319*** 0.139
(0.377) (0.00442) (2.947) (0.00781) (3.139) (0.00793) (0.103)
Booker*Other 1.764** 0.00151 8.586** 0.00498 -8.031 -0.00649 0.0395
(0.842) (0.00666) (3.889) (0.0126) (5.446) (0.0119) (0.169)
Black 1.604*** -0.00328 -6.150** -0.0539*** -6.696 0.0572*** -0.0471
(0.424) (0.00220) (2.789) (0.00809) (5.816) (0.00832) (0.0793)
Hispanic 0.817*** -0.00431 -5.826** -0.0390*** 1.482 0.0433*** -0.182***
(0.290) (0.00275) (2.249) (0.00948) (2.515) (0.0105) (0.0535)
Other -0.299 -0.00137 -1.544 -0.0212 7.618** 0.0225 -0.150
(0.574) (0.00500) (2.951) (0.0148) (3.757) (0.0154) (0.118)
Booker -2.407*** -0.00171 -4.303 0.125*** 1.707 -0.123*** -0.242
(0.899) (0.00936) (5.526) (0.0195) (4.912) (0.0212) (0.292)
Observations 200,093 200,093 7,002 200,093 79,541 200,093 113,549
R-squared 0.784 0.088 0.432 0.188 0.906 0.166 0.989
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009, in the subset of cases for offenders in the lowest criminal history
category and no weapon used. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each offense level
and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month fixed
effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5
percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.
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Figure I
Sentence Lengths in Months, by Defendant Race
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. Data points are quarterly averages.
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Figure II
Dynamics of Black White Gap, Sentence Length in Months
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. This figure shows coefficients from a dynamic DD regression
identical to specification (1) in Table II, but with leads and lags for the five years before and five years after Booker,
interacted with defendant race. The coefficients represent the differential sentence lengths between black and white
defendants, compared to the pre-period (1994-1999). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Race specific
trends are excluded because of limited variation, but magnitudes are unchanged when race trends are included.
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Figure III
Dynamics of Black White Departure Rates
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. This figure shows coefficients from a dynamic DD regression identical
to specification (1) in Table II, but with leads and lags for the five years before and five years after Booker, interacted
with defendant race. The coefficients represent the differential above and below range departure rates between black
and white defendants, compared to the pre-period (1994-1999). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Race
specific trends are excluded because of limited variation, but magnitudes are unchanged when race trends are included.
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Figure IV
Rate of Mandatory Minimums, by Defendant Race
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. Data points are quarterly averages.
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